CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AS A FORCE MULTIPLIER: IMPLEMENTATION FOR ALL PHASES OF A MILITARY OPERATION
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INTRODUCTION

This document is designed as an introduction for establishment of cultural property protection (CPP) practices as a cross-cutting consideration for implementation as organized by the Phases defined in the NATO Crisis Management Process: Phase 1- Indications and Warning; Phase 2- Assessment; Phase 3- Response Options Development; Phase 4-Planning; Phase 5-Execution; Phase 6- Transition. It is also intended to be used in concert with other critical NATO and international documents including: the CIMIC CCOE document, Cultural Property Protection Makes Sense; A Way to Improve Your Mission; the new UNESCO Military Manual, Protection of Cultural Property [In Armed Conflict]; AJEPP 2, Allied Joint Environmental Protection Publication (2) entitled Environmental Protection Best Practices and Standards for Military Camps in NATO-Led Military Operations; STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO-Led Military Activities; STANAG 2449 LOAC, Training in the Law of Armed Conflict; The United Nations Special Report in the Field of Cultural Rights; and Protecting Civilians from Violence; a Threat Based Approach to Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations.

The CIMIC document makes a strong case for the importance of cultural property protection considerations in military operations, delivers a detailed discussion of the legal framework that provides a foundation for these considerations, and illustrates many of the critical points to be made using lessons and cases from historical and recent military experiences.

The UNESCO military manual offers comprehensive guidance in terms of law governing protection of cultural property. As it states in its own introduction, this manual “combines a military-focused account of the relevant international legal obligations of states and individuals with suggestions as to best military practice at the different levels of command and during the different phases of military operations, whether by land, sea or air” (O'Keefe 2016). This document is intended to be the definitive international reference for laws of armed conflict with respect to cultural property protection.

AJEPP 2 devotes Appendix I to CPP. This discussion focuses on cultural property considerations with an emphasis on the challenges posed during site selection for establishing and expanding military camps. NATO STANAG 7141 articulates the environmental requirements that include CPP in the form of NATO Doctrine.

STANAG 2449 LOAC insures that training in preparation for NATO led missions includes coverage of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; the requirements and responsibilities entailed therein.

The United Nations Special Report in the Field of Cultural Rights (Bennoune 2015) includes protection of heritage as a fundamental cultural right and articulates concern for threats to heritage during the course of modern conflict. With a more specific focus on military planning, threat analysis and response, Protecting Civilians from Violence incorporates concerns for the risks to cultural property as a component of ethnic cleansing and genocidal behavior.
As the Phases of a NATO military crisis are considered, it will quickly become clear that CPP can make a critical contribution to mission success and that the absence of CPP risks mission failure. CPP is a legal requirement under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), customary international law, and in many cases, national law. Therefore, failure to implement effective CPP not only can compromise the mission, the associated failure to observe IHL can result in liability for the combatant commander. The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict establishes relevant international legal standards for protecting cultural property and has been ratified by almost all of the NATO member and partner countries. The Convention defines cultural property as including religious and historic structures, monuments, archaeological sites; objects such as works of art, manuscripts, books, and other objects and collections of artistic, historical, scientific or archaeological interest; and repositories such as museums, libraries and archives. Its core principles prohibit attacks on and military use of cultural property, unless excused by military necessity. It also prohibits and requires the prevention of theft, pillage, misappropriation, and acts of vandalism against cultural property as well as illegal excavations and trafficking.

It is also important to note that the core principles of cultural property protection apply to both state and non-state actors and to entities, including states, which may be supporting non-state actors. While civilian authorities might be officially responsible for CPP inside their respective countries, frequently in times of crisis, especially the most severe ones including conflict, natural and manmade disasters, it is the military instrument which is ultimately requested to intervene. It is also becoming increasingly clear that intentional targeting of cultural property may be serving as an indicator of, precursor to, or component of, acts of cultural cleansing or genocide. Failure to protect cultural property also delays transition to social order post-conflict. The fight against criminal activities like illegal excavation and antiquities trafficking can also be a critical component of stability policing in the post crisis environment.

PHASE 1- INDICATIONS AND WARNING

Lack of CPP planning can exacerbate social disorder; eradicate national, ethnic, and religious identities; elicit international condemnation; and prolong conflict. If planned and executed correctly, CPP can be a force multiplier by concurrently contributing to international and domestic stability and goodwill.

Nations that have ratified the 1954 Hague Convention have an obligation to inventory the
cultural property within their own territories. However, few countries have prepared such lists of information. Ideally, reliable cultural property inventory and geo-spatial data layers would be available at the global level, but as of 2016, the data requirements under 1954 Hague have not begun to be met. Phase 1 is essentially a pre-crisis phase. This time period provides the opportunity for establishing subject matter expert partnerships, collecting data, and insuring the data are available in a readily accessible format for military use and interoperability. The pre-crisis phase is also the appropriate time to determine whether it might be necessary to establish a specialized deployment capability for cultural property protection. It is important to note that the “pre-crisis” phase can rapidly evolve from a steady-state situation where detailed and long term planning is possible to a situation where the cultural property located in a specific area of responsibility (AOR) needs to be analyzed against the mission operations, plans and goals in order to effect protection of cultural property (Phase 2, Assessment).

During Phase 1, the military has the chance to plan long term for effective implementation of cultural property protection programs. Planning and preparations during pre-crisis times will significantly improve effectiveness and efficiency if pro-active CPP is needed during implementation stages. This period of time provides the opportunity for completing cultural property inventories and for identification of subject matter expert institutions, organizations, and individuals, all at the global level in coordination with other relevant ministries such as Culture, Interior, Homeland Security, and Tourism; essentially the appropriate ministries at the nation level.

The positive experience with NATO implementation of the cultural property inventory list prepared by academics for use in Operation Unified Protector in Libya illustrates the value of completing the inventory process during Phase 1 and at the very latest Phases 2 and 3.¹

Cultural property inventory data-mining and management should be occurring during this phase. All of the preparatory requirements listed below are made easier if thorough preparation at the global level is complete prior to embarking on the requirements for mission planning in a specific AOR. In an ideal and fully implemented CPP military program, the following elements are in place:

- Cultural Property Protection policy and doctrine articulated and adopted at the ministry of defense level with appropriate staffing and documents.
- A clear understanding of the international and domestic legal requirements for cultural property protection during the course of military operations. These requirements need to be articulated throughout the ministry or department of defense and the force.
- A global inventory of cultural property in a geo-spatial data layer format immediately accessible to military planners is present and readily available.
- A global inventory of cultural property subject matter experts who are willing to work with the military that offers up-to-date contact information is readily available to military planners.

The second critical component of Phase 1 preparation for cultural property protection is preparation of a trained and educated force. Preparation can range from handing out simple

¹ See also discussions of this case in the CIMIC CPP Makes Sense document and the NATO 2012 Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center (JALLC) report entitled Cultural Property Protection in the Operations Planning Process.
awareness materials like Soldier pocket cards to an advanced degree specializing in the material culture of the AOR. Nations preparing to implement an effective cultural property protection program need to:

- Establish introductory CPP awareness training for all personnel. Opportunities for introductory training can occur during basic training and education and during promotions, change of role and rank specific courses.
- Determine which deploying military specialists require specialized training and education, develop and deliver the information programmatically.
- Establish protocols for pre-deployment and mission specific cultural property protection training.
- Establish a professional military education curriculum for military leaders that covers CPP and require successful completion of the courses.
- Develop and inject a regimen of cultural property protection scenarios into field training and exercises at all levels.

**PHASES 2 AND 3- ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT**

*Once the steady state is lost, it is time for Mission Specific and AOR Analysis to commence.*

**COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION**

A check list for cultural property response includes:

- Identification of subject matter experts for the operational area of responsibility, ideally including host nation experts, government representatives, and community leaders.
- Identification of stakeholders and non-NATO entities who may serve as potential partners in support of CPP. However, it is important to be aware of alternative agendas. External stakeholders may not share the military’s immediate mission goals. For example in 2001, monastery representatives at Matejce, Macedonia requested that CIMIC specialists leave a vandalized mural of St. Peter untreated as a political statement, at least until a peace treaty was signed.
- Completion of political and legal research insuring awareness of all legal agreements pertaining to cultural property in the AOR, for example applicable UN resolutions.
- Preparation of an inventory list of cultural property present in the AOR, including geographical coordinates that can be used to establish CP geo-spatial data layers for operational and planning maps and no strike lists. These inventories must be accurate and verified.²
- Properties need to be evaluated against potential intelligence and considered for their strategic and tactical potential. For example, an iconic place of worship where damage or destruction would exacerbate a conflict might warrant additional protection.

² Ideally, this inventory has already been prepared during Phase 1 and is ready for immediate upload. The motto is “The right information to the right people at the right time.”
Another example would be situations where protection of specific monuments could serve as an indicator of values and allegiances at the local population level.

- Intelligence, operations planners, and targeteers need to check the results of the inventories against the potential targets in order to determine the presence of specific challenges as part of the pre-crisis analysis. Not only could there be cultural property located in the immediate vicinity of, or adjacent to, a military target, but opposing parties might also be using cultural property for perceived tactical advantage.
- Cultural property must also be analyzed in terms of its potential as a high value target and a form of critical infrastructure for opponents. DAESH may have made the taking of Mosul and the Ninevah Plain a priority not only for the performance destruction potential but also for the opportunity to loot and sell antiquities from the ancient cities located there.
- Development of information and/or reference tools that can help military personnel identify cultural property in an unfamiliar landscape.
- Identification of vulnerabilities and potential strategic communication (StratCom) challenges related to cultural property for the AOR and mission.
- Identification of non-lethal targeting options for situations where the vulnerability analysis identifies the need for proportionate response or target avoidance.
- Determination of whether cultural property challenges will require additional capacity. Initially, it will be the military who will be required to secure CP. If adequately resourced, this responsibility could be handed off to the Military Police (MPs). If MP resources are insufficient and regular soldiers are assigned to protect CP, the immunity of the site could be compromised under 1954 Hague unless this form of security is declared to the adversary. To avoid complications of this nature, military planners need to determine whether the presence of a major ancient city, archaeological site and/or major museum will require additional law enforcement capacity. It is important to remember that the reputational risk to NATO forces for damage to CP is greatest during the period of least security immediately post conflict when risk of looting, vandalism, and destruction is highest.
- Use the baseline information that has hopefully been gathered during Phases 1-3 in order to assess the nature of the potential cultural property to be encountered in the AOR and the associated risks. For example, if the predominant forms of cultural property are archaeological sites, the potential risks are vulnerability to erosive forces, motor vehicles, illegal excavation, and looting. If the historic structures are made of paper and light wood, as in parts of Asia, vulnerability would be fire.
- Also use the baseline information and data on the ground to specify critical CP at risk. If possible, gain input from members of the local community. It is on the ground, at the local level, where NATO forces have the opportunity to offer protection to CP that matters, as opposed to CP that is identified on global and national lists. Damage to local CP risks reputation, influence, and force protection.

The CIMIC handbook for field assessment is a tool that should also be utilized for collection of cultural property information, insuring that information is submitted in previously agreed upon formats.

As a cautionary note, liaison relationships need to be undertaken with appropriate personnel and
organizations at the appropriate levels, as identified above. It is important to recognize that in some situations the nature of the conflict, like entering a theater of operation by force, may prevent any form of military interaction with host nation personnel. It is also critical to remember that Operational Security (OPSEC) takes precedence over any potential host nation liaison effort.

It is important to recognize that during the shift from indications and warning to assessment and response options development, the cultural property education component shifts from general awareness to mission specificity. Opportunities to train in the context of pre-deployment can include:

- Preparation for the possibility that opposing parties may be using cultural property for tactical advantage.
- AOR specific CPP scenarios that are injected into pre-deployment training exercises
- Mission specific review of legal requirements affecting cultural property.
- Review of the geo-spatial data layer for the AOR, identification of unknown cultural visual signatures in remote sensing imagery.
- Identification of ancient and/or indigenous infrastructure.

Opportunities to consider CPP can include:

- Induction training for the mission
- Inter-operational Capability (IOC) evaluation
- Full Operational Capability (FOC) evaluation
- Transfer of authority
- MP briefings prior to leave and R&R – especially where souvenirs are concerned
- Post mission debriefing. Commanders, Intel, Ops and Planning Personnel should be introduced to the Intel/Ops significant activities stemming from illegal behavior in the AOR/JOA especially looting, trafficking, and connected revenues.

GUIDANCE: ESTABLISHING TOOLS FOR MANAGING CULTURAL PROPERTY IN THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Tools for effective management are a third aspect of thorough preparation for military operations. Examples include detailed regulations with command authority, and the inevitable forms and questionnaires:

- Site survey and selection for contingency basing must include evaluation for the potential of cultural property present.
- Sophisticated understanding of the CP as a source of information and/or intelligence should be part of the AOR analysis.
- Environmental baseline studies of proposed new construction or expansion locations must include a cultural property component.
- Environmental regulations and/or guidance must consider cultural property, and the guidance should be signed at the highest possible level.
- Engineers and planners need to recognize and appreciate indigenous forms of
infrastructure.

- An effective reporting mechanism must be created and established for situations where cultural property is encountered unexpectedly during the execution phase and/or is being used by the aggressor for perceived tactical advantage. This mechanism must work in real time.

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**Ukraine, Defiant Protection of Lenin Statues at the Village Level**

In May of 2015, the government of Ukraine imposed a ban on Soviet symbols. These symbols included statues of Vladimir Lenin. In 1991, there were more than 5,500 statues of Lenin documented across the Ukraine. These numbers indicate that almost every small town would have a Lenin statue in a prominent public space like the village square. Anti-Soviet villages began destroying Soviet symbols prior to the ban, but in areas sympathetic to the Russians, citizens organized to protect these monuments. As a result, by mid-2015, standing Lenin monuments become a key to assessing community loyalty at the very local level in a stressed political environment.

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**ENVIRONMENTAL BASELINE ANALYSIS FOR CULTURAL PROPERTY**

Note that cultural property needs to be a component of a comprehensive Environmental Baseline Survey (EBS). In the US, for the purposes of an EBS, cultural resources are defined as “anything that is significant to the local population.” For global application, it is critical to remember that resources may be present that are not significant to the local population but that may be highly significant to a displaced community or global citizens at large. The “local” definition may not be used to discount or disrespect any form of cultural property present in the AOR.

To prepare for an EBS, the US requires:

- Documentation of individual burials, burial grounds, and cemeteries that may be marked or unmarked.
- Documentation of areas of religious significance.
• A list of all known parks, forests and/or animal preserves, and recreational areas in or around the site.
• Interviews with local nationals.
• A list of host nation or local subject matter experts and points of contact information for cultural properties or resources from academia, museums, government agencies, or other sources of pertinent and reliable information.

➢ US EBS Recommendations

The US EBS Forms DD2993 and DD2994 request that in an area with the potential for cultural property, the surveyor:

• Take photographs and note the location using grid or GPS coordinates.
• Note the areas of significance on the site sketch or map overlay.
• Describe the general surface appearance and disturbances such as irregular holes and trenches from vandalism or looting or regular emplacements from recent military or other use.
• Provide impact assessment from checklist criteria.
• Identify parks, forest or animal preserves and recreational areas on or near the site.

The US form also notes, “If it is determined that the historical or cultural resources must be protected to prevent damage or looting by pot hunters or black market antiquities dealers, it is likely that documentation of the site should be annotated in Section 14 [of the EBS survey form] as classified information.”

The Impact Criteria are as follows:

• Impact Level 1: No impact. There are no resources present or the proposed mission could avoid them if they were present.
• Impact Level 2: Less than significant impact. Resources are present, but the proposed mission would only have minor effects without the need for mitigating actions.
• Impact Level 3: Less than significant impact with mitigation incorporation. Resources are present but with the implementation of mitigating actions, effects can be minimized to an acceptable level. Design avoidance, the concept of altering a project design to avoid cultural property identified within a proposed project footprint, is an example of a mitigating action.
- Impact Level 4: Potentially significant impact. The proposed action would likely cause a substantial adverse change in the significance of a historical or archaeological resource, disturb a known religious, traditional, or cultural resource or disturb any human remains, including those interred outside of formal cemeteries.

Should there be impacts at Levels 3 and 4, mitigation could be considered during Phase 6, Transition. At that point, a meaningful mitigation process would include consultation with local stakeholders and subject matter experts.

**PHASES 4 AND 5- PLANNING AND EXECUTION**

*During Phases 4 and 5, protection of cultural property offers challenges as well as opportunities.*

**CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT**

In the hybrid warfare operational environment, the commander is likely to encounter situations where aggressors are defying international laws of armed conflict, and in the case of cultural property may be engaging in: acts of deliberate destruction; use of cultural sites for tactical advantage; and looting, theft, and vandalism on a large scale. In many cases, the aggressors may have publicized their actions at the global level, engaging in sophisticated social media campaigns with cultural property serving not just as a backdrop but often as a focus. The challenge is for the Commander to be as informed as possible so that cultural property is not only protected but also the opportunity for a proactive approach to preservation and stewardship is communicated in a strategic way.

**ASSESSMENT OF CPP IN OPERATIONAL SITUATIONS**

- The commander must be completely cognizant of not only international and domestic legal requirements for cultural property protection required in all operational situations but also completely informed of any special legal requirement applying specifically to the mission at hand. The mission legal advisor bears tremendous responsibility here. For example, the UN Security Council Resolution 2100 establishing the response force for Mali includes the cultural property protection mandate. In 2014, the mandate was strengthened, authorizing the use of deadly force for the protection of cultural property, a first in the history of the UN.
- If cultural property is encountered unexpectedly, mission planning must be updated according to orders and directives.
- Illegal activities affecting cultural property must be reported.
- Liaison with local police and relevant local authorities is critical since deliberate damage to, and crimes against, cultural property can hamper military operations and exacerbate the conflict.
When the US Marines entered Nasiriyah, Iraq in 2003, they found a structure that was safe and secure - it was the provincial museum. Notice the care taken to respect the objects and displays. The Carabinieri TPC fell in behind these Marines and had positive comments about the behavior of the US Force and the condition in which they found the Museum after the Marines had left. Respectful behavior of this nature increases the potential for acceptance of a foreign force.

**INFORMATION MANAGEMENT**

- Mission planners must stay aware and ahead of the StratCom implications in situations where cultural property is put in play.
- Commanders need to be constantly prepared to counter the opponent’s media campaign while exploiting and disseminating positive news such as arrest of looters, traffickers or grave robbers.
- As the kinetic event unfolds, stakeholders need to be aware of and report on the status of cultural property and its protection, especially for use as lessons identified and hopefully learned (good and bad) taking into account operational security.

**DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION**

- The cultural property geo-spatial data layer needs to be verified, updated, and accessible to all who need it and must be interoperable. As interoperable mapping technology becomes more available to military personnel at all levels, this goal will become increasingly achievable.
- As a conflict unfolds, cultural property geo-spatial information needs to be “two way.” Operators need access to the most up to date information that would require continuous dissemination of updated data layers along with the ability to upload information concerning encounters with unexpected property, damage assessments, and situation reports. Cultural property issues can also have tactical implications.
- As the combatant commanders become increasingly familiar with cultural property types and indicators, the information needs to be shared across the force.
- The combatant commander must anticipate if possible and be prepared to respond if the aggressor chooses to use cultural property as a vehicle for its propaganda. Thorough preparation will include advanced discussion of potential outcomes with information operations, media operations, and public affairs.
The COCOM Action Group has designed a double-sided Soldier Pocket Card that provides CPP information relating to the Soldier’s area of responsibility and offers space to record unmapped cultural features that the Soldier may encounter. Printed on waterproof card stock, the Soldier Pocket Card fits neatly into the shoulder or leg pocket of a standard issue U.S. Army combat uniform.\(^3\)

**REPORTING AND DOCUMENTATION**

- If cultural property is damaged, the commander needs to engage and handle the consequences; especially where StratCom and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) are concerned.
- As a crisis unfolds, the cultural property issues require ongoing attention. If the combatant commander is properly prepared, the operational mapping assets for the mission will already include the cultural property geo-spatial data layer. As the force covers the operational area, there are going to be data and mapping updates required.
- If cultural property is damaged either deliberately by the opposing parties or inadvertently by friendly forces, reporting needs to begin as soon as possible, ideally with documentation meeting forensic standards.
- Even basic damage documentation should include: Date and time of report; individual or unit submitting the report; location of the damaged property, ideally in 8 digit military grid coordinates; name of the site or property if known; condition of the property (excellent, good, fair, poor, destroyed, gone); cultural significance if known; context or relationship to local or descendent population; and sensitivity.
- Assess sensitivity, essentially analyzing the damage situation to determine potential implications at the local, regional, national, and international levels.
- Create an administrative record of the event. In addition to damage documentation this record should include: any protective measures initiated by military personnel, any potential or confirmed impact on the mission, and recommendations for future action. Recommendations could include: StratCom guidelines, inspections by subject matter experts and/or appropriate authorities, capacity-building for prevention of future incidents, and preservation plans.

\(^3\) It is available for download at: http://cchag.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/cchag_Soldier_Pocket_Card_tri-fold.pdf
Stabilization offers an opportunity to establish essential cultural property protection capabilities within a local police/military force including gendarmeries. This force should be prepared for a full handover and ownership while keeping reach-back opportunities, links with national and international stakeholders, and support from afar. While NATO Security Force Assistance (SFA) will reinforce local military, SP assets will concentrate on gendarmeries and local police with training, mentoring, monitoring, advising, reforming, and partnering. Experience and lessons learned derived during conflict inform the process of developing and adopting policy and doctrine, in turn driving development and implementation of best practices.

STABILIZATION

Military responsibilities during this phase could include assessment of the condition of cultural property in the post conflict environment, framed by questions like:

- Are immovable cultural properties like buildings and monuments damaged, mined or destroyed?
- Are collections hidden, missing, stolen, damaged?
- Is there information available concerning inventory and/or documentation of the conditions of cultural property prior to the conflict?
- Are there religious sites remaining that belong to a minority that has been attacked during the conflict?
- Are there properties present that may be targeted for ideological reasons?
- Are there burials at risk in locations where a population has been displaced?
- Are there archaeological sites or collections that are at risk for looting in situations where social order may lapse?

Helpful considerations include:

- Identification of key actors to assist with CPP assessment; who to share information with, when, where, who to support, what to mitigate.
- Maintenance of subject matter expert liaisons with potential for immediate reach back capability if needed.
- Assessment of post conflict vulnerabilities.
- Identification of potential military and agency allies with CCP capability.
- Initiation of activities such as CIMIC to support protection, reconstruction, and recovery of Cultural Property.
RECONSTRUCTION

Military responsibilities during this phase could include:

- Assessment of short and long term host nation capacity to manage and provide stewardship for its own cultural property. It is very important to listen when the host nation expresses confidence in its own ability to regain stewardship responsibility.
- Maintenance of CP situational awareness.
- Information on the status of cultural property conditions needs to be shared with responsible and appropriate host nation representatives.
- Continuity to insure that transition forces are continuously educated and informed on host nation cultural property issues.
- Support for host nation civilian institutions.
- Handing over of cultural property assets to appropriate civilian institutions for long term stewardship responsibility.
- Defense capacity-building with indigenous security forces if requested by host nation (SFA and SP).
- Development of host nation law enforcement agencies to investigate, control and interdict looting and trafficking while coordinating with international law enforcement and perhaps law enforcement from border countries.
- Training of personnel for protection and preservation of sites.

RESTORATION

- Conduct StratCom activities.
- Be positive about the potential role of CPP as a stabilizing and redevelopment asset for a community, region, or country.
- Recognize and emphasize the economic value of CP for the area, including tourism. CP as a source of future livelihood warrants protection. In addition to the economic drivers associated with tourism, local small entrepreneurs have business opportunities in terms of associated crafts and works of art.

In order to maximize benefit from crisis experience, it is critical to evaluate how the force performed with respect to cultural property.

MITIGATION, CAPACITY-BUILDING AND RECONSTRUCTION

During the post crisis transition period, sacred places and cultural heritage play a key role in the recovery and stabilization of communities as corporate entities. In addition to stability policing and restoration of the social order, cultural property protection during this phase often takes the form of projects designed to mend the fabric of society. These projects can take the forms of capacity building - educating and training members of host nation communities as a way of establishing, reconstituting or strengthening host nation institutions; mitigation or repair of properties damaged during the course of the crisis; and occasionally restoration projects. A common factor in successful transition projects is that project proponents paid close attention to the values and priorities as expressed by legitimate stakeholders from within the community.
Capacity building is in essence an educational enterprise. In addition to structured and formal institutional training and intervention, these efforts can also take the form of curatorial approaches to building interest and pride in the heritage and history of a community. The Iraq Site Guard Program offers a detailed example of institutional rebuilding and education using military assets. Another effective form of capacity building is mentoring. Stability policing and Advise and Assist missions are examples. The Italian Military Cultural Communication heritage projects in Herat offer examples of projects that were designed to encourage a community to go back in time to celebrate shared heritage with a goal of building unity.

**CARABINIERI IRAQI SITE GUARD PROGRAM**

One example of capacity building in the military context was the Italian Carabinieri peacekeeping deployment to Iraq. Prior to the first Gulf War and international sanctions against Iraq, the Iraqi government had a robust State Board of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH) and a provincial site inspector system with site protection. In fact, under the government of Saddam Hussein, conviction for looting archaeological sites could result in a death sentence. However, after years of sanctions and absence of foreign archaeologists, and with initiation of new conflict with the invasion in 2003, looting expanded to an industrial scale. At the behest of UNESCO, the Italians decided to send Carabinieri officers as peace keepers to the south of Iraq to support efforts in restoration of social order. One component of this mission was cultural property protection, featuring expertise from the Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Property or Carabinieri TPC.

The Carabinieri immediately recognized two things. First, that interdiction of looters and traffickers would contribute to the restoration of social order and second that a sustainable site protection program would require:

- Modern mapping and documentation of the known sites
- Professionalization of the site protection force
- Archaeological education for the force
- Restoration of a sense of pride in the uniform

The Italians worked extremely hard to map all of the key sites in Nasiriyah and Dhi Qar provinces so that they could use the geographic documents to organize a new site protection system. The new maps used aerial reconnaissance and photos to provide detailed map information for over sixty sites.

In order to professionalize the Iraqi Facilities Protection Service (FPS), the Carabinieri officers first had to transform them into a professionally recognized force that would be paid for their services. This transformation required:
• Selection of trustworthy site guards
• Budgetary commitment from the Iraqi government
• Provision of an ID card from the Iraqi police that governed the site guards’ capability to legally carry a weapon.
• Uniforms
• Training for site guards in essential policing skills, like how to collect evidence and organize and write reports. The archaeological component also required skills needed to identify and catalog recovered objects that would need to go to the provincial and national museums of Iraq.
• Vehicles with fuel, spare tires, and official insignias
• Reliable communications – like radios with potential backup on the other end
• Guard towers
• Structure for an investigative team that was also willing to grapple with issues like corruption

The result was development of a uniformed force. Even more important, during site visits six years later, it was clear that the regions of Iraq where the force was effective and looting had ended were more stable in every other measure of social order as well.

HERAT HERITAGE PROJECT

The Italian Heritage project in Herat is an example not only of capacity-building but also of restoration in the sense of rediscovering history. In this case, Italian personnel, including a cultural communications expert, reached out to the citizens of the city to work with them to rediscover their shared history. The result was a celebration of the history of the city entitled *Herat, The Florence of the East*, published in both Dari and English. Interviews began to uncover shared pride, not just in the Citadel which dates back to Alexander the Great, but also the Great Mosque, the Old City, the minarets, and shops of local artisans. Italian personnel worked with the Mayor to establish a museum within the Citadel (pictured above).
As the above illustration conveys, capacity-building and heritage projects need to be culturally appropriate, as depicted by a woman looking through a burka at interpretive signage.

**KANDAHAR AIRPORT ROSE GARDEN**

The Kandahar Airport Rose Garden illustrates the importance of listening to the stakeholders and appreciating their values. When NATO forces took responsibility for Kandahar Airfield, they also became stewards of the civilian airport facilities. When military personnel suggested expansion of the parking lot into the rose garden area, members of the community rallied to save the garden. The result was a cooperative project where maintenance of the beautiful garden became a shared priority. Over the past fifteen years, since the rose garden was saved, NATO forces and NGOs alike have continued to learn that gardens are highly valued in Afghan culture, and Afghans have made restoration of gardens a priority when working with NGOs. Had NATO personnel failed to listen to representatives of the local population and destroyed the rose garden at Kandahar Airfield, it would have created extreme hard feelings, and possibly compromised their own force protection.
APPENDIX A - READING THE CROSS CULTURAL LANDSCAPE

Even when armed with the best possible maps in the world, military personnel deployed into unfamiliar territory need to be able to read the clues in the landscape around them. Fortunately, some basic principles do apply:

- Noteworthy geographic features may take on sacred attributes.
- Generally, there are no regular patterns in nature. Therefore, features exhibiting straight lines, right angles, linear excavations or holes and other types of regular looking or repetitive patterns are likely to be manmade.
- An advantageous defensive position 6,000 years ago is likely an advantageous defensive position today. It is not unusual for foreign forces to find themselves occupying ancient sites.
- Local citizens may leave offerings to denote sacred, important or valued places. Candles, flowers, statues, monuments, ribbons, unusual colors or images painted on structures, and even bits of refuse deliberately tied to trees or fences should be noted.
- There are enormous differences across the world in terms of marking cemeteries and human remains. Sometimes the markings might even look like refuse or rubble.
- Some pathways and gathering places have been in use for thousands of years, and some of these locations may only be used periodically. Just because there is no one there today does not mean an attractive space or path is available for military use.
- Citizens will choose sacred and cultural properties for activities that reflect their most deeply held beliefs and values. Paying attention to these behaviors may have great intelligence value.

SACRED SPACES AND CEMETERIES

This stone landscape cradles the creation place of the Wanapum people, who are Native Americans living along the Columbia River in the US State of Washington.

The bits of plastic tied to this tree represent prayers, Mount Nebo, Jordan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roadside memorial, Rome</th>
<th>Burial markings including rubble, Iraq and Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ancient Cemetery, the Citadel, Amman, Jordan</td>
<td>Soldiers from Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, Task Force Strike, patrol past a cemetery in the town of Sanjaray in Kandahar province, Afghanistan, in February 2011. (Photo by Alex Berenson)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BLUE WALL

A unit of the 10th Mountain Division was assigned to stabilize and provide security for a series of villages where Taliban fighters had been gaining support. As they approached a small village they noticed a compound where the mud brick wall was painted blue. From the outside, it appeared that the compound contained a mature healthy orchard, one of the most prosperous in the area, and a small structure within.

As it turned out, the walled enclosure was a sacred place containing a shrine and religious relic dating back to Mohammed himself. Every Wednesday, villagers from throughout the region came to the compound for family picnics. Instead of entering the sacred space, the unit created a strong point adjacent to the blue wall. They met with members of the village leadership and promised that as long as the unit was based in the village they would assist in protection of the shrine and that no NATO Soldiers would enter it. For the duration of their stay, as long as the unit was within the boundary governed by the village elders, there was no hostility, and the NATO force was able to operate in the region with confidence. Recognition of and respect for the sacred place created a force multiplier for bringing stability to the village and in turn to the region.

CLUES

These red flags on buildings in Vienna indicate historic importance. This structure houses the Medical Institute Museum.

Commemorative plaque indicating that the structure is listed on the US National Register of Historic Places.
The camel market is located just outside of Giza, Egypt. On Fridays, dozens of merchants from as far away as the Sudan bring hundreds of camels for sale. If military personnel were to enter the camel market on any other day, they would find lots of space with ideal infrastructure for bedding down; courtyard walls, good roads, and even running water.

By the same token, an ordinary road can become impassible on festival days or during pilgrimages.

**AGRICULTURE**

**“VINEYARDS ARE THE WORST”**

Anticipating the earthen trellis structure of the vineyards of Afghanistan illustrates the tactical value of cultural property information. The traditional method of growing grapes in Afghanistan is to create earthen berms that can be up to four feet tall and two feet wide that offer a vertical face for the vines to grow up while systematically channeling and conserving water. The earthen trellises offer cover, and familiarity with this agricultural practice is essential for engaging aggressors in the landform. Not only can the trellises be used for cover by friendly forces as shown here, but a vineyard in full foliage can conceal hundreds of aggressors in an agricultural landscape that would otherwise appear to be peaceful and quiet. During the battle of Sperwan Ghar, Afghanistan, January 19 2007, “gunfire rang out from every hedgerow, every irrigation ditch, and every grape hut. The green leaves nurturing the region’s raisin crop grew so thick that U.S. Special Forces couldn’t even see the muzzle flashes from the AK-47s aimed their way.”

Stability operations in vineyards are further complicated in a culture where land represents family honor. As a result, the community loses respect for vineyard owners whose property is damaged, destroyed, or overrun without visible and generous compensation. If those owners are elders and key village leaders, compromising respect for them also creates political instability at local and regional levels.
An American soldier from the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, peers through the scope of his assault rifle, while taking cover in a vineyard. The mud berms offer cover, usually favoring the insurgents' defensive positions, and they are exhausting for soldiers to traverse. (U.S. Army photo)

Members of the 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, patrol a grape vineyard with members of the Afghan National Army in Char Shaka, Kandahar province, Afghanistan, on April 28, 2011. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Justin A. Young)


Paratroopers of the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, patrol for insurgents in a vineyard Aug. 1, 2012, in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan. The battalion is part of the 82nd Airborne Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team. (U.S. Army photo by Capt. Thomas Cieslak, Task Force 1-82 PAO)
### OTHER AGRICULTURAL INDICATORS

Crocus fields where women harvest saffron. (Photo courtesy of AFP Photo / Aref Karimi)

At OP Coleman, COP Monti, Afghanistan, (a British outpost dating to the 1800s) looking at terrace farm fields. Terraced fields are often irrigated by karez systems in Afghanistan.

![Terraced fields](image)

**Damaged or destroyed agricultural assets can take decades or generations to recover. Often groves with fruits like date palms or olives are passed down through families. Sometimes the trees are individually named for family members or planted in celebration of important events. At this point they become heritage assets as well. (Date palm grove and irrigation infrastructure in the Ash Shawqiyyah Region, Oman. Photo courtesy of Hugh Wilson).**

Olive grove mixed with fruit and nut trees just outside of Petra, Jordan. Notice again the stone walls designed to retain as much moisture as possible.
Karez (or Qanat) are a type of underground irrigation canal running between an aquifer (underground water source) on the piedmont (mountain or higher elevation) to a garden on an arid plain. They are common in Afghanistan.

The linear feature of circles in the foreground of this photo taken in Wardak, Afghanistan, are the surficial access to cleaning channels for the ancient karez water system. The circles mark the path of an underground tunnel that is carrying water from the toe of the slope to a nearby village. The length of a karez is punctuated with access shafts, which are added for three reasons: as an air supply, to allow the removal of sand and dirt, and to prevent the tunnels from becoming dangerously long. The shafts are not very far apart, and as a result, a karez seen from the air gives the impression of a long, line of holes in the ground.

Jordanian military watch tower at the ancient city of Gadara/Umm Qais on the Syrian border. Positions on ancient sites also pose a force protection risk, because the layers of ancient ruins also mask the presence of voids beneath, like original sewers, cisterns or basements of ancient structures.

This village on the Island of Hvar, Croatia represents an entire water supply and agricultural system. The large flat structure on the upper left collects, stores and initiates distribution of water to the village below and the surrounding agricultural fields, where the plots have been terraced and lined with rocks to retain the moisture. Similar systems are found throughout the ancient world and Africa. Damage to any component of ancient infrastructure – agricultural terraces, walls, conduits without meaningful support for mitigation or repair during Phase 6 can exacerbate instability.
TAKE AWAYS

The essence of reading the landscape can be distilled into the following guidance.

- Be sure to have a thorough understanding of the nature of indigenous infrastructure so that potential tactical advantage on the part of insurgent forces can be anticipated. Not only can agricultural infrastructure offer cover, ancient ruins, and tunneled water systems pose force protection challenges in the form of voids hidden beneath what appears to be a secure position.
- Pay attention to activities focused around or related to cultural property. These actions may reflect community loyalties and assist in anticipation of flash points. Observing behavior associated with cultural and/or sacred property has potential for great intelligence value.
- Pay attention to features valued at the local level. For a community these features may matter more than a world heritage site included on the cultural property inventory.
- Once identified, respecting features that matter may lead to increased acceptance of a foreign force. The opposite is also true.
- During Phase 6, Transition, pay attention to and act upon concerns expressed about damaged or disrespected property. Failure to mitigate damage to infrastructure and agricultural systems can exacerbate instability.
APPENDIX B- COMPREHENSIVE CASE: UR

PHASES 1-6

Management of the ancient Mesopotamian City of Ur offers an opportunity to follow a cultural property through all the phases of the NATO crisis management process. Beginning with Phase 1- “Indications and Warning,” Ur illustrates the case of opposing forces using cultural property to provide passive protection for a military base. In the mid-1980s, Saddam Hussein decided to construct Imam Ali Air Base adjacent to the ancient City of Ur. In fact, Iraqi leadership during his regime consistently selected historic sites all across the nation for construction of military bases for perceived tactical and strategic reasons. The thinking under Saddam was that foreign governments and powers would be more reluctant to attack such installations from the air out of concern for potential collateral damage to the adjacent historic site. Ur, considered by some to be the birthplace of the prophet Abraham, may, along with Babylon, be one of the best known of Iraq’s ancient Mesopotamian Cities. It was originally excavated by Sir Leonard Woolley in the 1920s and 30s. Saddam reconstructed the façade and monumental staircase of the ziggurat in the 1980s. He also attempted to reconstruct a “birthplace of Abraham” on top of the ancient city walls exposed by excavation, some say with the hope that Pope John Paul II would choose to visit Iraq.

The act of constructing a major military installation immediately adjacent to world heritage sites and properties of national importance is a violation of customary international laws of war and the 1954 Hague Convention. In terms of additional Phase 1 indications and warning considerations and Phase 2 assessment, the importance of the ancient city meant that there was general awareness of the immediate presence of the cultural property among military planners, even though in both Gulf Wars, the western powers were operating without the advantage of comprehensive cultural property geo-spatial data layers for Iraq.

During Phases 2 and 3, there is no question that responsible military powers find that planning military operations in the immediate vicinity of heritage sites to be more challenging because the potential for collateral damage has to be taken into consideration. The presence of cultural property affects the angle of attack and choice of weapon for every single bombing run. It can be noted that at Fort Drum’s Aerial Gunnery Range 48 and at Edwards Air Force Base, replica cultural property targets were constructed adjacent to the actual targets so that the training pilots had an opportunity to practice for this situation.
For the western powers, the fact that Iraq had created a military target in the immediate vicinity of the ancient city meant that from a legal perspective, the air base was a legitimate military target, albeit with the consideration that every effort be made to minimize collateral damage.

During the first Gulf War, the Iraqis allegedly even parked valuable aircraft next to the ancient ziggurat hoping for more protection. The term allegedly is used here because, there were also StratCom implications. There are still questions about whether the US “photo-shopped” images of the aircraft into a photo of the ziggurat for their own StratCom purposes or whether Saddam’s forces actually parked the aircraft at that location. The George Bush White House archives discuss Ur, reflecting the fact that the US President recognized the StratCom importance of the issue.4

In 2003, western forces secured the air base, referred to as Talil by the Air Force and Camp Adder by the Army, with minimal damage to the ancient city. However, the US immediately recognized that the ancient Mesopotamian City archaeological sites in the region were being systematically looted for artifacts. The ironic result is that once Talil became a major US led coalition military installation, systematic looting and the associated lawlessness could not be tolerated just outside the fence. The decision was made to incorporate the remains of the ancient city into the installation perimeter, restricting access only to western military personnel and their associates. The effect was protection for the archaeological remains.

During Phases 3-5, knowing that base construction under the Iraqis had impacted some of the archaeological deposits on the outskirts of the ancient city, the military engineer responsible for Talil made some attempts to minimize any further damage resulting from US and coalition presence. Professional archaeologists were permitted to visit the installation, to analyze detailed aerial imagery of the area and to express any concerns to military leadership.

For Phases 3-5, Ur also illustrates the importance of continuing awareness, feedback, documentation, and reach back. In 2009, the situation in Nasiriyah and Dhi Qar provinces had stabilized to some extent, and the Iraqis were watching US personnel visiting the ziggurat. The western Soldiers were holding ceremonies on the monumental staircase, posing for pictures, and participating in tours organized by chaplains, while the Iraqis looked through the fence. At one point, the local archaeological inspector from the Iraq State Board of Antiquities was denied access at the gate to the Installation. The issue created tension, and it became clear that it was time to return the site to Iraqi stewardship. MG Oates, responsible for the site at the time, approved a delegation consisting of the US State Department Heritage representative, an Army archaeologist, and the President of the Archaeological Institute of America.

The first challenge was to rebuild the perimeter fence to in order to separate the military installation from the ancient city while keeping the base secure. The fence project and new visitor checkpoint required excavation that inevitably disturbed deposits of pottery and mud brick, eliciting concern from the provincial inspector. The delegation was able to reassure the Iraqis that the fence project had a minimal impact on the site deposits, and communicate to the military leadership that the time was right to return the site to Iraqi stewardship. The presence of the President of the Archaeological Institute of America was a brilliant move from the StratCom

4 http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ogc/apparatus/crafting.html
and reach back perspective. His impeccable credentials combined with respect from his colleagues served to neutralize any criticism of US management of the site from professional archaeologists. His presence also illustrate the fact that many cultural resource professionals, including leaders in their fields, are more than willing to assist the military when asked. Ultimately, the site reopened with a concert celebration in May of 2009. Over 350 Iraqis attended, another StratCom victory as the situation in the region entered Phase 6- Transition. In terms of force multiplication, the archaeology delegation also noted that in areas of southern Iraq where Iraqi nationals were protecting the archaeological sites the regions were more stable and peaceful. Most of the protected sites also offer examples of effective international support for site protection capacity-building.

In order to insure a form of more permanent protection of the monumental structures at Ur, the site is currently being documented using digital imagery by an NGO called CY-ARK. This process creates a 3-D digital record that could be used to rebuild the site in the eventuality of a tragedy. The 3-D image can also be used as a form of documentation. Should the site ever be attacked, the information now exists that would make very specific damage assessment possible. In addition, CY-ARK and its principle scientists would be logical potential partners, should subject matter experts on the region be needed by the military in the future. As we consider the issue of partnership and SMEs, it becomes clear that CPP is not only a phased process but also a continuous one, and when done properly hastens the return to Phase 1.
# APPENDIX C - TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR CPP

## PHASE 1 – INDICATIONS AND WARNING

### Essential

Introductory CPP awareness for all, at least one hour – the video game may be the best solution here. However, in absence of sophisticated training tools, even a lecture presented by competent Unit Cultural Advisor or representative of the civilian cultural education/research institution could fulfill this requirement.

### Recommended

- Identification of Cultural Property on the Battlefield – one hour presentation or interactive ppt
- CPP injects developed and inserted into map and/or field training exercises
- Opportunities to work with CP details in intelligence databases

## PHASES 2 AND 3 – ASSESSMENT AND RESPONSE OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT

### Recommended Pre-deployment for all Personnel

- Introduction to cultural property of the region
- Review of burial customs and markings
- Review of potential sacred spaces, features, and structures for the region
- Evaluation of cultural property as flash points for intelligence
- Evaluation of cultural property for potential use by aggressors for tactical advantage,
- Remind the force of penalties for purchasing looted objects and attempting to export “souvenirs”
- Involve stability policing (SP) or military policing (MP) personnel to acquire details concerning local challenges: modus operandi; types of criminals; preferred smuggling routes; and illegal markets – including sales to military personnel

Note: all of these concepts could be introduced as illustrated lectures and supplemented with interactive exercises.

### Essential Specialty Training

- Introduction to the CPP geo-spatial data layer for Intel and Planners – hands on workshop
- For the Commander – legal responsibilities for CPP and liabilities for failure; the CPP Makes Sense document discusses the case of Dubrovnik and Strugar’s conviction in the International Criminal Court (ICC) at den Haag and subsequent jail sentence for deliberately targeting a marked and protected cultural property on the world heritage list.
- Meaningful inclusion of CP into the EBS and Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) assessments and site survey processes for Engineers, Site Surveyors, and Intelligence Personnel – field exercise - guided site
assessments in the field with a CP professional including not just presence or absence but also CP as OPFOR strategic or economic target

- Legal Advisor Training, CIMIC and/or Professional Military Education (PME): Introduction to Cultural Property including definitions; Introduction to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict; International Customary Laws of War with respect to Cultural Property; and appropriate respective introductions to national cultural property protection legal requirements during the course of military operations
- Introduction to sacred property and religious material culture in the cross cultural environment for Chaplains
- Stability police personnel should be specially educated and trained to assess site security for collecting institutions like museums; to assess site security for monuments and immovable cultural property like archaeological sites; to provide security to prevent looting, illegal excavations, and trafficking; to arrest perpetrators caught in the act or after investigations; to train local museum/archaeological/tourism police/guards; to provide information to data bases of stolen goods; to collect CPP information as intel; and to be able to train the force to assist in all of the above
- Military police should be educated so they can inform other military personnel about the consequences of damage to or theft or purchase of protected cultural property.

**PHASES 4 AND 5 – PLANNING AND EXECUTION**

- Recommended for all Personnel
- Reminder of importance of and methods for tracking and documentation for deliberate and/or collateral damage to cultural property
- Reminder of importance of and methods for aggressor use of cultural property for tactical advantage
- Take advantage of opportunities for on-site training if such opportunities arrive within the parameters of force protection
- Essential Specialty
- Testing and maintenance of interoperability of the geo-spatial data layer for intel and planners
- Reminder and implementation of cultural property damage and/or protection reports for the STRATCOM specialists

**PHASE 6 – TRANSITION**

*Recommended for all Personnel*

- Take advantage of on-site training opportunities similar to those conducted at Cyrene in World War II and at Saqqara during Bright Star War Games.

*Essential Specialty*

- Honing skills for working with NGOs and IOs
- Effective interaction with host nation stakeholders
- Any required supplementation for stability and military policing
As discussed throughout the Phases, collection and management of data for accurate mapping of cultural property located in a crisis area, is a complex process requiring meaningful partnerships between subject matter experts, local community stakeholders, and military personnel. When used for target avoidance purposes, there are rigorous requirements for Quality Assurance and Quality Control or QA/QC. In addition, in situations where adversaries intend to identify and deliberately destroy cultural property, questions of data security must also be considered.

As NATO engages in development of CPP best practices, the United States Army in partnership with the US Committee of the Blue Shield has developed and is offering a model for collection, management, QA/QC, and military dissemination of cultural property data.
## Information Collected From and Attributed to Data Sources

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tr>
<td>Description/Title of the CHN Resource (REQUIRED)</td>
<td>The proper title must be provided by the source. This is not the unique identifier which will be assigned by CERDIP.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHN Feature Description</td>
<td>A resource category/type can be used to further describe the resource. CERDIP will absorb this information if it is provided. If not provided, this will remain blank. This information may also assist in the translation to other DOD data models.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location of the CHN Resource (Latitude, Longitude, Geometry) (REQUIRED)</td>
<td>The purpose of the CERDIP is to assemble the CHN resources for plotting on a map. To be able to map the resource, the location needs to be collected. At a minimum, the Latitude and Longitude of the item is required. By default, the process will render the resource as a point, unless sufficient GIS geometry is provided to plot the resource as a polygon or line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country (REQUIRED)</td>
<td>The country in which the CHN resource is physically located. The country may be a Country Name or a numeric ID (3-character minimum) from the International Standards Organization 19000 Standard. This is required field in the CERDIP Data Template.</td>
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<td>Data Source Name</td>
<td>As an aggregation process, it is important to capture the source of the data so it can be attributed appropriately and updated on a recurring basis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date the data was obtained (REQUIRED)</td>
<td>The date and time at which the data is obtained must be included in the template. It is at the discretion of the analyst executing CERDIP what ranges of data are acceptable for the timeliness and accuracy of the information. This is a required field within the CERDIP Data Template.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Link to view the source record, if available.</td>
<td>If the data source provides a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) to view the record in fuller detail.</td>
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NGA Feature Data Dictionary Definition for “Cultural Site Recognition”:

“Information about the recognition of a significant cultural site by a site register. Description: Official recognition for a cultural site can be exhibited by its inclusion in a register that is used to list significant cultural, historic, scientific or natural places or structures.”

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>Date Obtained</td>
<td>Date data acquired from data source (e.g. downloaded).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Data Link</td>
<td>URL to search data source page for feature by name and country.</td>
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<td>Qualitative/Ordinal ranking to indicate level of validity of the data; also to indicate if any QA/QC was performed (1) None = no QA/QC performed (2) Unverified = QA/QC performed but unable to validate coordinates/descriptions (3) Poor = coordinates are inaccurate (4) Good = coordinates are accurate</td>
</tr>
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</table>

NGA Feature Data Dictionary Definition for “Cultural Site Recognition”:
**Distribution Sensitivity** is dictated by the source of the data. Although unclassified, if data has been collected and/or modified by the US Government, it receives **Restricted** status by default.

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**CERDIP Vision: Globally-Centric Option**

1. **Browse, Download & Use Existing Data**
   - Online-Available Data (**“80% Solution”**)  
     - Satisfies Low Risk Application
     - Visualization Platform

2. **Research & Host Nation Data (**“20% Solution”**)**  
   - Continuous Improvement of Data Records
   - Submitted in CHN Data Schema format

- **CHN Global Geodatabase UNCLASS**
- **Quality Improvement**

---

**Requirement Generator (RG)**  
DoD Activities  
- COCOMs, SCCs, Civil Affairs, USAEC  
- Mission needs drive country, risk/application
Intended Use Drives QA/QC

Data Entry QA/QC
- Remove Duplicates
- Validate Driver
- Validate Distribution Level
  → Correct Errors

Geo-referencing QA/QC
- Compare Aerial Imagery and Coordinate Systems
- Compare Sources Against Each Other
  → Annotate according to ordinal ranking

Research QA/QC
- Engage Subject Matter Experts – Community of Practice
- Conduct Archival/Library Research
  → Update Records/Update Ranking

Maximum QA/QC
- Conduct “Boots on the Ground”/Civil Affairs survey process (i.e. ROGUE)
- Rectify site size and location information
  → Update Records/Update Ranking

Minimum QA/QC

Simple Transition Vision

“80% solution”
- Easy download/update
- Low level QA/QC
- Minimal changes
- Annual updates
  *Low Risk Scenarios*

“20% solution”
- High LOE; More time
- High Level QA/QC
- Update as needed
  *High Risk Scenarios*

CHN global Geodatabase UNCLASS

Distribution Platform

Users
Conceptual Model Phasing Stages

APPENDIX E - CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION SYNDICATE OUTCOMES

Conceptual Model Phasing Stages

Indications and Warning (Phase 1) → Assessment (Phase 2) → Response Options Development (Phase 3) → Planning (Phase 4) → Execution (Phase 5) → Transition (Enable Civil Authorities) (Phase 6)

Prevent Prepare → Crisis defined → Prevent Prepare

Assure friendly freedom of action → Establish dominant force capabilities → Establish Security, Restore Services, Transfer to Civil Authorities

Achieve full spectrum superiority → Recover forces

CPP Phase 0/1
CPP Phase 2
CPP Phase 3


Conceptual CPP Model Phase 0/1

Indications and Warning (Phase 1) → Assessment (Phase 2) → Response Options Development (Phase 3)

Prevent Prepare → Crisis defined

CPP Phase 0/1 (normal/pre-crisis/crisis emerging)

- Identify locations, conduct mapping, utilise precision sensing
- Conduct liaison (who, what, what level e.g. IDs, NGOs, National)
- Conduct political checks, understand & know legal agreements (e.g. UN resolutions etc...)
- Determine criteria (e.g. for assessment, for value [both financial and culturally])
- Develop competent cultural SMEs and links to academia and future NATO actors
- Develop & execute appropriate training scenarios
- Train and educate NATO forces and national capabilities
- Develop special deployable capabilities
- Conduct Mission Analysis with especial focus on CPP and Cultural Heritage
- Conduct "mission-focused" analysis of previous campaigns with a CPP & Cultural heritage focus
- Develop STRATCOM capabilities to understand own and potential adversaries vulnerabilities
- Networking and enhanced situational awareness and knowledge development
- Conduct detailed collective and individual TTEI to prepare & identify capabilities & deficiencies
- Update and verify data for specific areas
- Engage with SMEs and specialists and assess relevant RNAs

Desired Outcome: Identify possible impact and capabilities required to manage CPP & Cultural Heritage factors in a NATO operation

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Conceptual CPP Model Phase 2

Response Options Development (Phase 3)
Planning (Phase 4)
Execution (Phase 5)

Assure friendly freedom of action
Establish dominant force capabilities
Achieve full spectrum superiority

CPP Phase 2 (Crisis/Conflict)
- Data & mapping updates and situational awareness including access to data
- Established reporting mechanisms e.g. destruction of sites, hotspots, validation of data, ability to generate “big data” via triangulation from various sources
- Establish “ground truth” validity through use of GIS/IDT/PAV/AGI
- Maintain, liaise, share information on CPP
- Use of force mandates, add additional guidance for protection of CPP/Cultural Heritage, targeting mechanisms for dual use
- “Consequence Management” – non lethal targeting, timely assessment and analysis of even and adversary in area of CPP & Cultural Heritage
- Develop, execute and review no-strike lists and assess need for protection (both physical and non physical CPP/Cultural Heritage
- Engagement (i.e. non-kleists) at all levels with NGOs, Governments
- “Consequence Management” – mitigation of failure in CPP/Cultural Heritage including integration of STRACOM, PSYOPS, Info Ops
- Integration of Cultural Heritage factors and planning in STRACOM, PSYOPS, Info Ops
- Collection and evaluation of Lessons Identified and best practices and further mitigation (e.g., STRACOM, LEGAL, PSYOPS, Info Ops etc.)
- Development, execution and evaluation of CPP outcomes and objectives to support campaign planning and establishment of mission success
- Recognition/implementation into planning processes of CPP as not just a legal obligation

Conceptual CPP Model Phase 3

Execution (Phase 5)
Transition (Enable Civil Authority) Phase 6

Establish Security
Restore Services
Transfer to Civil Authorities
Recover forces

CPP Phase 3 (Stabilisation, post conflict re-construction, transition)
- Support to Civilian Institutions of HN
- Handover of CPP assets, organisations etc. to appropriate Civilian Institutions
- CIMIC activities to support protection, reconstruction & recovery of CPP related issues/property etc.
- Liaison & maintenance of CPP requirements
- Training for personnel, protection & preservation of sites
- Defence Capacity building with indigenous security forces if requested by Host Nation
- Evaluation and Development of CPP/Cultural Heritage Best Practice and Lessons Learned
- Development of law enforcement agencies to investigate, control, interdict looting and trafficking
- Maintain CPP/Cultural Heritage situational awareness
- Conduct STRACOM activities
- Develop NATO doctrine & TTPs
- Identify key actors to assist with CPP assessment e.g. who to share info with, when, where, who to support, what to mitigate
- Assessment of CPP damage and destruction
- Sharing of information and handover of information to Host Nation
- Assess long term Host Nation capacity for CPP and identify key actors (short – long term)
- Assess own vulnerabilities, identify priorities for protection (i.e. what to protect first i.e. not just physical property)
- Explore use of CPP as a stabilising asset for country and redevelopement
- Prevent looting & destruction (prevent long term damage which could hinder reconstruction & transition)


NATO. 2013. STANAG 2449 LOAC; Training in the Law of Armed Conflict. Brussels: NATO.

NATO. 2014. STANAG 7141, Joint NATO Doctrine for Environmental Protection During NATO-Led Military Activities. Brussels: NATO.


