EXERCISE TRIDENT JAGUAR 2018
REPORT (2)

30 September 2018
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In late 2017 NATO invited Blue Shield International (BSI) to participate in Exercise Trident Jaguar 2018 alongside other NGOs. This was a first for BSI, reflecting both NATO's emerging institutional commitment to cultural heritage protection, and BSI’s determination to develop closer relations with state party armed forces and NATO itself. From BSI’s perspective exercise participation was a success that should be repeated on future exercises. The aim of this report is to capture the experience in order to table lessons that inform both BSI and NATO thinking about cultural heritage protection activities on operations, as well as the cultural heritage protection environment on future command post exercises.

The exercise allowed NATO to:

- Work in partnership with cultural heritage protection subject matter experts during operational planning.
- Replicate the political-military-heritage framework fundamental to the delivery of effective cultural heritage protection.
- Develop its own conceptual thinking towards operational solutions for the conduct of cultural heritage protection tasks.

The exercise allowed BSI to develop its understanding of:

- NATO's command processes.
- The conduct of high-level command post exercises.

Headline lessons identified:
• NATO contributing nations must teach and exercise cultural heritage protection during command and staff training if NATO is to realise its aspiration to develop cultural heritage protection best practice on operations.
• Proactive protection of movable and immovable cultural heritage before, during and immediately after armed conflict is a major cultural heritage protection touch point for NATO, working in support of state party agencies, and should be factored repeatedly into command post exercises.
• Cultural heritage protection should be written into the structure of all NATO scenarios, to include a framework that specifically establishes state party ministries of culture, UNESCO, and national Blue Shield committees, with the expectation that BSI, in its role as an NGO promoting cultural heritage protection, will role play those entities, to varying degrees, as required.
• Exercise development must generate just enough cultural heritage content to prompt a small number of complex cultural heritage protection challenges.
• UNESCO should be invited to initiate the Mission of Control, as established in the 1954 Hague Convention, at the outset of all operational activity; the Mission of Control should be exercised on all NATO command post exercises.
• Effective cultural heritage protection is conditional on dynamic cultural heritage intelligence production that extends beyond issues relating to the targeting function, the no-strike list, and state party cultural heritage inventories.

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1.0 Context

1.1 Exercise Trident Jaguar 2018 (TRJR18) was a command post exercise designed and delivered by NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), Stavanger, to exercise NATO Multinational Joint Headquarters, Ulm (MNJHQ Ulm), and the Headquarters of the National Rapid Deployable Corps, Greece (NRDC-GR). The scenario rehearsed procedures for the command and control of combined, joint operations at force level, spanning the planning and execution of a NATO Article 4 scenario, whereby ‘the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened,” (Article 4 differs notably from Article 5, which states that any attack against a member nation is an attack against all members and which also allows for the use of armed force.) Invoking Article 4 has been described as an effort to ‘steer clear of inflaming...conflict’.

1.2 BSI was invited to participate in its capacity as an NGO, bringing subject matter expertise to bear alongside stakeholders including ICRC, UNOCHA, and Transparency International. Working collaboratively with other NGOs enriched scenario development, achieving synergistic effects, grounding, for example, the trafficking of cultural heritage within the wider corruption problem set. This approach compelled the training audience to adopt a cross-cutting approach to such issues during planning - a Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) level coordination challenge.

1.3 BSI attended a preparatory NGO briefing event in Ulm, followed by a Main Events List (MEL)/ Main Incidents List (MIL) scripting session (two days) at JWC Stavanger. The two-part execution phase involved exercising MNJHQ Ulm at the JWC facility in Norway (three days for BSI), followed by an equivalent three days (for BSI) exercising HQ NRDC-GR on a training area close to Thessaloniki, Greece. In total, BSI expended some 15 working days supporting the exercise, not including preparation time and travel.

Lesson identified: early engagement with NGOs constitutes best practice: it enables detailed scripting of events and incidents, coincident with exercise training objectives.
1.4  During the execution phase BSI was embedded in the so-called ‘White Cell’, a group of some 20 highly experienced NATO contractors employed to replicate state party stakeholders, including the ministries of: defence; foreign affairs; security; public order; internal affairs, as well as third party regional actors. The White Cell coordinated its activities under JWC control, in an open, collaborative environment involving a daily regime of coordination meetings followed by player interaction and feedback. This demands a high degree of subject matter expertise as well as sufficient exposure to/experience of military culture in order to be able to relate to and engage with a large headquarters planning a complex mission at a high tempo. The activity of all participants in the exercise, whatever their role, was realised via NATO’s SECRET HIGH CIS infrastructure.
**Lessons identified:** BSI staff must accrue a thorough understanding of NATO’s command and control environment, including doctrinal approaches and staff processes. Participation without such understanding is near impossible. Further, effective participation is conditional on BSI staff holding clearance to work at NATO SECRET, which is a precondition for access to exercise intranets, including email, dynamic social media spaces, and exercise materials, across the higher controller (HICON) and the training audience domains.

1.5 BSI particularly valued interaction with SHAPE’s Exercise Evaluation Team, whose members made time to develop their own understanding, and took a close interest in the cultural heritage play. A lot of learning took place, much of it around the periphery of the training audience, bringing with it the potential to feed back to the SHAPE J9 cultural property protection proponent. From BSI’s perspective, this was a major positive outcome.
1.6 The exercise CIS environment facilitated proactive media and social media play, extending to simulations of FaceBook and Twitter, rolling news, and interviews. Cultural heritage protection is inherently newsworthy, especially when the exercise scenario involves real-world sites. Prompted by BSI, the White Cell media team wrote compelling copy on cultural heritage issues, and BSI delivered dynamic commentary on events via Blue Shield social media accounts.

**Lesson identified:** BSI must include (social) media activity in its exercise development activity, not least the early uploading of relevant images to the exercise database. In some scenarios, playing cultural heritage media activity might constitute a full-time BSI White Cell task in order to create instances when #BlueShield, #CPP, #MinistryOfCulture and #UNESCO trend on exercise simulations of FaceBook (FacePage) and Twitter (Chatter).

### 2.0 BSI Approach

2.1 The top-level exercise framework did not specify training objectives for cultural heritage protection. BSI therefore adopted a twin-track approach, working out of core:

#### 2.1.1 NATO publications:

- *An Introduction to Operations Planning at the Operational Level*, 2013

#### 2.1.2 UNESCO publications:

- The *1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property and its two Protocols*
- The *Protection of Cultural Property Military Manual*

2.2 Recognising that cultural heritage protection was not specifically written into the Trident Jaguar scenario at the time of its inception, and therefore did not inform TRJR18 exercise
development from the outset, BSI set out to achieve its self-appointed mission: to generate just enough cultural heritage content in order to prompt a small number of complex MNJHQ level challenges. Both training audiences were compelled to address the core structural imperatives of the 1954 Hague Convention:

2.2.1 Preparatory peacetime pillars:
- Preparation of inventories
- Planning of emergency measures for protection against fire and structural collapse
- Preparation for the removal of movable CP or the provision of adequate in situ protection
- Designation of competent authorities responsible for safeguarding (the so-called Mission of Control)

2.2.2 Executive armed conflict pillars:
- Activation of the Mission of Control
- Application of safeguarding measures for cultural property in the Special Protection category
- Transportation of Cultural Property in the Special Protection category
- Use of the Distinctive Emblem

noting that enabling the latter presupposes the pre-existence of the former – an exercise writing challenge.

Lessons identified. Cultural heritage protection must be written into the political structure of exercise scenarios from the outset. Exercise development must generate just enough cultural heritage content to prompt a small number of complex cultural heritage protection challenges. Those challenges must compel training audiences to address the core structural imperatives of the 1954 Hague Convention, and demand sustained, detailed staff planning.

3.0 Framework for Cultural Heritage Protection
3.1 The Trident Jaguar baseline exercise scenario lacks a state party structure for cultural heritage affairs; cultural heritage protection has typically been played as a subordinate issue by the contractor representing the Ministry of Public Order (MOPO). However cultural heritage protection is a substantial specialist field that requires independent representation by expert practitioners. BSI experienced the legacy of this approach: without a strong professional focus, White Team cultural heritage exercise incident development has been underdeveloped, creating challenges that do not demand rigorous assessment and planning, leading to gestural training audience engagement - a phenomenon observed early in the training audience on both exercise execution phases. BSI carved out the cultural heritage piece, removing it from wider MOPO issues, an approach that was fully supported by the White Team. The implications of this are discussed below in some detail, including the elaboration of events and incidents that deliberately generated rich, complex problems demanding decision making at Force level: the training audience was compelled to take cultural heritage protection seriously, and plan in detail to meet its challenges.

**Lessons identified.** Cultural heritage protection should be written into the structure of all NATO command post exercise scenarios. Scenario development must establish a framework that specifically establishes state party ministries of culture, UNESCO, and national Blue Shield committees with the expectation that BSI, in its role as an NGO promoting cultural heritage protection, will role play those entities to varying degrees, as required.

### 4.0 Intellectual and Conceptual Environment

4.1 BSI-driven cultural heritage scenario development was designed to challenge reductive thinking via a close address to the 1954 Convention and its two protocols, in particular. The following observations set the context for specific event/incident development relating directly to the ‘pillars’ of the 1954 Hague Convention, outlined at paragraph 2.2.

4.2 Overall, HICON, including the White Cell, and both training audiences, were deeply invested in combat as the ultimate measure of performance in relation to the utility of military power. While this is entirely understandable, exercise participants were collectively typically less
inclined to expend energy on matters beyond the generation and application of combat power in pursuit of desired effects. They occasionally manifested:

4.2.1 An inclination to regard international humanitarian law as a matter to be complied with on a discretionary basis.

4.2.2 With the signal exception of J9 staff, a consequent tendency to regard non-kinetic issues, such as the protection of civilians, cultural heritage protection, and host nation opinion as a picaresque backdrop that had to be acknowledged, but must not be allowed to present significant challenges so as to demand close attention by headquarters staff. In the absence of a larger body of dedicated role players it sometimes proved difficult to compel the attention of both White Cell staff and the player audience, beyond a cursory nod in the general direction of the cultural heritage protection issue at stake at any moment.

4.2.3 A disinclination to register that cultural heritage protection:

- Poses a significant information operations challenge.
- Amounts to more than the integration of a received inventory of cultural property into the ‘no-strike’ list.

These factors sometimes posed a challenge for BSI: the ‘drag factor’ this outlook created amounted to a form of friction, impeding the full development of training audience engagement with cultural heritage protection challenges. In BSI’s opinion, this situation reflects the current modest level of training in this topic. Most of the JWC staff, as well as the training audience, including its lawyers, have never had cause to engage with cultural heritage protection in general, and the 1954 Hague Convention in particular. Annual awareness training alone does not provide sufficient depth of understanding/knowledge to enable best practice in the operational planning domain.

**Lessons identified.** Cultural heritage protection training objectives must reflect the contemporary standard of individual training. This makes for a particular collective training challenge for exercise writers, and requires careful event/incident scripting. The contemporary standard of individual training also determines what approach best serves the delivery of training effect. During TRJR18 BSI sometimes ended up running training audience tutorials, at training audience request, that extended to suggesting courses of action and advising staff on what they might do next.
The JWC training team was divided on this issue: some thought BSI was there to enable collective training understood as the application of pre-existing subject matter knowledge, not train in that sense; others that small, guided steps delivered tangible training outcomes in a little understood subject. BSI takes the latter view. Nor is this doctrinally incoherent: the role of the UNESCO-appointed Commissioner-General for Cultural Property, discussed below, is to oversee, advise, and coordinate, and if that extends to time spent in conversation during detailed planning, albeit in a slightly artificial manner, then that’s fine.

BSI consequently considers that the centre of gravity of cultural heritage protection training is staff training: all force and formation headquarters require a solid, collective understanding of the issues at stake, reinforced by the advice delivered by specialist staff officers, as required. There is more work to be done in this respect. The major cultural heritage protection lesson of TRJR18 is that NATO contributing nations must teach and exercise cultural heritage protection, understood as an implied operational task, during command and staff training if NATO is to realise its aspiration to develop cultural heritage protection best practice on operations.

4.3 **Peacetime preparation of inventories (cultural heritage intelligence).** Cultural property intelligence provision is a vexed real-world issue. TRJR18 did not feature prioritised national inventories of cultural property, as described by the 1954 Hague Convention, a situation perhaps unwittingly reflecting operational realities. The exercise environment did, however, include a ‘no-strike’ list. In the absence of comprehensive cultural heritage intelligence, the pragmatic BSI approach to realising exercise training objectives is to script specific CPP challenges using a limited number of ‘real world’ sites/locations where possible. The absence of a basic intelligence CPP database and, on the other hand, the furnishing of adequate cultural heritage intelligence to the training audience, without exercising the J2 intelligence function, was a command post exercise artificiality that risks teaching false lessons about the availability/accessibility of cultural heritage intelligence, but was successful as a vehicle for exercising selected, scripted cultural heritage protection challenges. That said, BSI event development deliberately never offered perfect access to the situation: planning staffs were always confronted with the need to know more in order to enhance the quality of their decision support activities.

There is scope for enhancing the J2 contribution to cultural heritage protection exercise activity,
and thereby teach important lessons in the future. The existence of a dynamic ‘no-strike’ list is vital, but does not inform every context in which cultural heritage protection decisions must be made: cultural heritage protection is not just about a ‘no-strike’ list.

**Lesson identified.** Exercising the J2 intelligence function in support of cultural heritage protection staff activity is highly desirable. It requires detailed planning early on during exercise development. Cultural heritage protection as a topic to be exercised must not be reduced merely to issues surrounding the ‘no-strike’ list.

4.4  **Planning of emergency measures for protection against fire and structural collapse.** The exercise of generic emergency measures for protection against fire and structural collapse generally falls outside the concerns of a military exercise. Somewhat optimistically, perhaps, it may be assumed that owners of cultural heritage sites have met this requirement. That said, incident scripting might address such issues where it appears relevant to the exercise context – such as disaster relief operations.

4.5  **Preparation for the removal of movable CP or the provision of adequate in situ protection.** The 1954 Hague Convention emphasises that state parties must prepare for the removal of at risk movable cultural heritage, or the provision of adequate in situ protection for the immovable. Proactive cultural heritage protection in this manner is *always* an implied task to be factored into military planning from the outset.
4.6 Both TRJR18 training audiences were faced with the task of planning to support the evacuation of an archive of very great importance to a people, from an at risk museum to a designated improvised refuge – a host nation problem set. Both training audiences progressed from feeling content with expressing empathy and support in a generic sense to undertaking detailed, cross-cutting staff work leading to the production of a commander’s decision brief, and the first draft of a FRAGO designed to meet the specific military support activities requested by the host nation.
This praiseworthy outcome was a salient exercise success that should be developed on future exercises. MNJHQ Ulm J9 Division has declared its intention to consolidate its exercise experience in a workshop event to be held in the autumn of 2018; BSI looks forward to developing mutual understanding of this generic challenge.

4.7 Both TRJR18 training audiences were faced with the (implied) task of planning to protect a world heritage site (landscape) implicated in joint combat operations. Overall, this significant challenge was not handled so well. Unprompted, training audiences were slower to register the need for detailed planning, to include the eventual transition from combat to stabilisation operations, and the hand over of WHS terrain/infrastructure to competent civilian authorities, all of which posed manifest information operations risks and opportunities. In the opinion of BSI the seemingly reluctance to recognise the gravity of the task, and to plan accordingly, reflects points
raised at 4.2, above, particularly when J5 Plans is embarked in planning kinetic operations. Cross-cutting planning in complex environments spanning the civil-military divide during periods of transition from one operational phase to another, in particular, is a significant Force level challenge; experience suggests that cultural heritage is especially at risk if uncoordinated planning generates unintended security and governance vacuums during transitional operational phases.

Lesson identified. Proactive protection of movable and immovable cultural heritage before, during and immediately after armed conflict is a major cultural heritage protection touch point for NATO. The lead role of a host nation (especially its heritage agencies), supported by deployed NATO forces, in achieving this mission should be factored repeatedly into command post exercises.
4.8 **Designation of competent authorities responsible for safeguarding (Mission of Control).** The exercise did not feature the cultural heritage protection Mission of Control, as established in the 1954 Hague Convention. BSI opted to activate the little-used Mission of Control in order to validate its utility in the context of contemporary NATO operations. Experience on TRJR18 suggests that the protocols defining the Mission of Control are very well suited to the task of activating operational relationships between top-level stakeholders, including UNESCO, SHAPE, state parties, and deployed NATO forces. BSI considers that the execution of the Mission of Control is a defining activity, fundamental to the mission to protect cultural heritage.

4.9 The Mission of Control is articulated in ‘Regulations for the Execution of the [1954 Hague] Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict’, and can be summarised graphically:
The Mission of Control establishes a command and control apparatus tailored to the task of conjoining a high contracting party's (HCP) state institutions; in-country armed forces (whether indigenous or 'expeditionary'); representatives of the appointed Protecting Power(s); and specialist inspectors appointed to conduct nominated tasks. Its intended effect is to reinforce cultural heritage protection liaison, communication and coordination across potentially problematic political-military fault lines. Moreover, this extends, via the Protecting Powers, to equivalent missions of control in adversary and third party states:

4.10 BSI draws particular attention to the role and status of the Commissioner-General for Cultural property, whose executive powers are, in principle, considerable:
4.11 The political structure of the TRJR scenario (played by the White Cell) does not establish state party ministries of culture, nor does it designate wider competent authorities responsible for safeguarding activities; such a thing probably wasn’t necessary until NATO adopted a structured approach to cultural heritage protection. Including BSI in 2018 exercise activity was a watershed in this regard, reflecting NATO’s developing position. It should be noted that BSI chose not to represent itself (except on social media), but the UNESCO-endorsed Commissioner-General for Cultural Property, whose role is given structure and coherence by the wider Mission of Control, under the authority conferred by the 1954 Hague Convention.

4.12 One person played both the Commissioner-General for Cultural Property and, when required, the State Party Representative for Cultural Property Protection, throughout the training audience environment, from Commanding General to CIMIC staff. Activities included: office calls on senior
staff; briefings on the cultural heritage challenges as perceived by the state party/Commissioner-General on behalf of UNESCO; and direct input (specialist advice) to military planning teams. Acting as the White Cell cultural heritage lead, BSI dynamically scripted and coordinated injects, gave media interviews, and injected social media content. Given the relatively modest complexity of the cultural heritage protection play on TRJR18, one person was just about enough. Two people would have been ideal.

**Lesson identified.** A major take away from TRJR18 is that the Mission of Control (a core pillar of the 1954 Hague Convention) should be activated in concert with UNESCO and implicated state parties at the outset of all operational planning, and exercised on all NATO command post exercises. In particular, future exercise play should pivot around a model that emphasises the role of the UNESCO-appointed Commissioner-General for Cultural Property.

### 5.0 Main Event/Incident Development

5.1 BSI developed a number of TRJR18 events to activate cultural heritage protection challenges. Many of these occurred on territory owned by the host nation and controlled by it and/or NATO forces, noting that events occurring in enemy-held or third party territory pose a different order of intelligence challenge.

### 6.0 Summary of BSI Lessons

6.1 Annex A provides a summary of BSI lessons identified on TRJR18.

BSI wishes to thank:

- The JWC in general, and Tom Gooch in particular, for making BSI exercise participation possible.
- MNJHQ Ulm J9, who generously gave BSI all the space it needed to develop its agenda.
- The US Air Force Culture and Language Centre, for inviting BSI to collaborate in their exercise support venture.
Organisation Information

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Summary of Lessons Identified

Operational capability

C.1 The signal cultural heritage protection lesson of TRJR18 is that NATO contributing nations must teach and exercise cultural heritage protection during command and staff training if NATO is to realise its aspiration to develop cultural heritage protection best practice on operations. All formation headquarters require a solid, collective staff understanding of the issues at stake, reinforced by the advice delivered by specialist staff officers, as required.

C.2 Proactive protection of movable and immovable cultural heritage before, during and immediately after armed conflict is a major cultural heritage protection touch point for NATO. The role of host nation, and/or expeditionary armed forces in achieving this mission in partnership with state party heritage agencies should be factored repeatedly into command post exercises.

C.3 The Mission of Control should be activated at the outset of all operational planning, and exercised on all NATO command post exercises. In particular, future exercise play should pivot around a model that emphasises the role of the UNESCO-appointed Commissioner-General for Cultural Property.

C.4 Cultural heritage protection is a dynamic intelligence problem set. The no-strike list does not always indicate what is out there – and it needs constant updating. Doing nothing to enhance one’s understanding is seldom an option. Exercising the J2 intelligence function in support of cultural heritage protection staff activity is highly desirable. This requires detailed planning early on during exercise development.
C.5 When operating on third party state territory, NATO is always acting in a subordinate role to the owner of the cultural heritage in question.

Exercise development

C.6 Cultural heritage protection should be written into the structure of all NATO scenarios. Exercise development must establish a framework that specifically establishes state party ministries of culture, UNESCO, and national Blue Shield committees with the expectation that BSI, in its role as an NGO promoting cultural heritage protection, will role play those entities, to varying degrees, as required.

C.7 Cultural heritage protection must be written into exercise scenarios from the outset. Exercise development must generate just enough cultural heritage content to prompt a small number of complex cultural heritage protection challenges. Those challenges must compel the training audience to address the core structural imperatives of the 1954 Hague Convention, and demand detailed staff planning.

C.8 Early engagement with NGOs constitutes best practice because it enables detailed scripting of events and incidents, coincident with exercise training objectives.

C.9 Working collaboratively with other NGOs enriched scenario development, achieving synergistic effects, grounding, for example, the trafficking of cultural heritage items within the wider corruption problem set.

C.10 Exercise development must include (social) media activity, not least the uploading of relevant images to the exercise database.

C.11 Cultural heritage protection training objectives must reflect individual training competencies. This makes for a particular collective training challenge for exercise writers at the operational level, and requires careful event/incident scripting.

C.12 Cultural heritage protection play must always constitute more than a series of minor incidents without operational consequences.

C.13 Training audiences must be compelled to execute detailed planning in order to receive maximum benefit from the experience.
C.14 Exercise cultural heritage protection events/incidents must extend over more than one iteration of the headquarters' battle rhythm in order that staff planning activity can be demonstrated to have consequences.

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C.15 BSI must champion the use of the Mission of Control.

C.16 BSI staff must develop understanding of the NATO command and control environment, including doctrinal approaches and staff processes.

C.17 BSI staff must hold clearance to work at NATO SECRET.