Blue Shield International CPP Exercise Content Workshop:

13-14 June 2019

Summative notes

The aim of the workshop was to share perspectives on the content of CPP civil-military exercise content, working out of collective training experience during recent military command post and field training exercises, civilian equivalents, and real-world operational experience.

Blue Shield set out an agenda that emphasised the importance of working pragmatically out of the 1954 Hague Convention, beginning with state party peacetime responsibilities to establish proactive protection measures to be invoked in the event of armed conflict, and to rehearse them on civil-military exercises in a holistic framework to include state party ministries of culture, their armed forces, and the heritage sector (clunky definition thought it is). Blue Shield described how it had worked with NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre in 2018, applying the Convention to the design and delivery of military command post exercises, and had identified lessons:

- Proactive protection of movable and immovable cultural heritage before, during and immediately after armed conflict is a major cultural heritage protection touch point for operational commanders, working in support of state party [host nation] agencies, and should be factored repeatedly into command post exercises.
- Exercise frameworks should replicate the political-military-heritage coordination structures fundamental to the delivery of effective cultural heritage protection; civ-mil command, control and coordination arrangements are vital factors that must be exercised.
- Effective cultural heritage protection exercise play is conditional on dynamic cultural heritage intelligence production that extends beyond intelligence requirements relating to the targeting function, the no-strike list, and state party cultural heritage inventories (all necessary components of exercise content).
- A cultural property protection Estimate template should be developed and used during collective training in order to inform the wider operational planning process, towards LOAC compliant courses of action.

Blue Shield proposed that there are three strands to CPP activity:

- Proactive protection – the core concern of the 1954 Convention
- Post-event first aid (to include disaster relief)
- Countering looting and illicit trafficking – also a concern of the 1954 Convention

Each of which suggest a range of stated and implied civil-military tasks, depending on the operational context. Each demands different, if complementary, approaches and skill sets. All of them are discussed below.

The workshop was structured around a loose framework defining generic types of military engagement across the spectrum of conflict: near-peer (and peer +) armed conflict; counter insurgency and counter terrorism; peacekeeping and monitoring; and disaster relief. All three strands of CPP are relevant in every case. While military concepts, such as counter insurgency, may not be legally defined, from Blue Shield’s perspective this does not constitute a challenge because state party ministries of defence and their armed forces work to politically sanctioned doctrinal norms, themselves inflected by the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). Given that the 1954 Convention is nested within LOAC, addressing CPP within operational contexts shaped by doctrinal norms should provide legal as well as intellectual coherence.
The 1954 Convention is a rich, ambitious instrument. In addition to establishing a legal framework, it nominates the strategic tasks High Contracting Parties (HCPs) are expected to undertake in peacetime in order to establish, proactively, a state party safeguarding regime for use in the event of armed conflict; notably the generation of inventories in three given categories and the production of plans. However the Convention attempts much more than that, bridging the transition to armed conflict itself in order to set out tactics, techniques and procedures for implementing core civil-military tasks towards the implementation of those plans. The Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, for example, deal comprehensively with: command, control and coordination; the dynamic use of improvised refuges and registers; the transport of cultural property; and use of distinctive emblems. The Guidelines for Implementation of the 1999 Second Protocol develop this approach.

Anna Kaiser presented her work at Donau University and her presentation is included, as is that by Tricia Fogarty from the US Air Force Culture and Language Center. Mark Dunkley later presented on non-state actors and the 1954 Convention, and Paul Shewry, on behalf of NATO’s Headquarters, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, gave an overview of the civil-military coordination branch of the headquarters.

### Day 1: exercise content in near-peer and peer + armed conflict

Reflecting the ambition of the Convention to reach down into battlespace dynamics (tactics, techniques and procedures) the workshop considered CPP exercise content in relation to the deep – close – rear doctrinal paradigm: close extending out to the maximum range of weapon systems in direct contact with an adversary (some 30km); deep extending out beyond the close to the maximum range of long range weapons (potentially 100+ km); and rear being the rear area in which force generation and logistics operations are conducted (also potentially 100+ km).

**Deep**

The discussion focussed on the crucial importance of cultural property intelligence. We discussed how the absence of HCP databases in the Enhanced, Special and General categories, produced and maintained in peacetime, as required by the 1954 Convention, compromises the proactive protection agenda: you can’t plan and execute military operations in a way that minimises cultural property destruction and damage if you don’t even know what’s out there; what it comprises; looks like; is called; its geographical extent; etc. LOAC in general and the Convention in particular demand that combatants take steps (pro)actively to understand what is at stake in order to be able to apply in good faith the principles of necessity; proportionality; distinction; limitation; and humanity. Unfortunately, the widespread reluctance of states parties to table cultural property inventories makes this imperative immeasurably more difficult to achieve.

We discussed how elements of the heritage community frequently rise to the challenge and take steps to fill the void when a crisis breaks out, at least partially, from their own professional resources. While laudable, this is less than an ideal solution and brings its own challenges, not least its last minute, ad hoc, nature. Further, ascribing cultural value on behalf of third party peoples potentially exposes the compilers, and the armed forces they attempt to support, to accusations of hegemonic cultural bias.

Working to common data standards, and with agreed data assurance protocols, are problems frequently encountered during collaborative initiatives. We discussed how the quality of military intelligence in general, and targeting intelligence in particular, is predicated on access to assured data, collated and integrated into an accessible database. This presents a massive information age intelligence challenge, compounded by the absence of state party cultural property databases. We discussed the need for cultural property GIS overlays to provide cultural property situation awareness during planning and mission execution.
We explored the (western) military targeting process at some length. It was pointed out that well-conducted deliberate targeting activity, fundamental to deep strike operations, offered a useful model for CPP good practice. Firstly, the ‘target systems analysis’ process offers a methodology for deconstructing how a site, entity, or capability, functions, thereby facilitating an assessment of vulnerability and of the risks attending possible courses of action. Target systems analysis offers a model for understanding cultural sites as well as of centres containing monuments (as defined in the 1954 Convention), thereby facilitating proactive protection initiatives, and also minimising the damage caused to such sites and centres, should they be taken into military use by an adversary combatant party and subsequently be subject to a deliberate attack.

It was pointed out that Targeting Board decision making constituted a critical event during which knowledge could be brought to the table by CPP experts and so inform context-specific decisions. Finally, the production of cultural property intelligence, including target systems analysis, and the conduct of targeting boards were activities that established an audit trail, facilitating any subsequent inquiry into CPP-related events and the decision making that catalysed them.

CPP needs to be folded into this demanding and highly specialist field, to include CPP specialist input during collective training events.

Close

While the conversation around the deep emphasised the highly structured, meticulously planned nature of deep attack operations predicated on excellent intelligence, the subsequent discussion about close operations reflected a general understanding of the more fluid, highly contingent, nature of the ‘contact battle’.

We discussed the delegated nature of decision making, noting the imperative to apply LOAC in all circumstances. Even when an adversary flouted the 1954 Convention and occupied cultural property, causing it to lose its legal protection in circumstances that necessitated the use of lethal force, the principles of proportionality, distinction and limitation were no less applicable. We noted the extreme difficulty – and indeed danger – attending such events, and reflected on the desirability of ‘disciplined restraint’.

A very useful conversation then developed about ‘training for discipline’: the need for context-specific CPP continuation training at the outset of operations, preparing all ranks for what they might encounter, and how they should react, in the very specific circumstances of their mission. Training for discipline might embrace:

• Recognising the need to avoid cultural property whenever possible, including an understanding of what ‘adequate distance’ (as defined in the 1954 Convention) might entail.
• The need to modify normative behaviour when necessarily occupying cultural property (such as prohibitions on digging and the parking of vehicles over a given axle weight, for example).
• Reporting the presence of cultural property.
• Respecting out of bounds restrictions, and complying with preventative traffic management tactics (such as speed restrictions and rerouting).
• Respecting the prohibition on looting and trophy taking.

We then addressed the wider environmental threats to cultural property posed by external actors in the area of operations. We heard that Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) doctrine already addresses the very particular challenges attending circumstances in which local governance has collapsed, creating a security vacuum in which looting and opportunistic theft was symptomatic, extending to targeted theft and organised trafficking in cultural property. We discussed how important it was to plan in order to
mitigate the heightened risks posed by looting, crime and structural damage during security vacuums, noting that, wherever possible, the host nation (owner) of cultural property should always lead.

We discussed the utility of a risk mitigation triage model that reflected the proactive imperatives of the Convention itself as well as the need to work out of a thorough estimate of threats, vulnerabilities and risks:

- Remove
- Protect in situ
- Deter

We talked about the implied need to conduct cultural property first aid reconnaissance activity to assess sites whenever, and as soon as, possible, noting that attempting to do this in proximity to combat operations necessitated a complementary risk management exercise regarding the protection of those involved. (The only Allied ‘Monuments Man’ to be killed in action during the Second World War was hit by mortar fire in Cleve while recovering an object from a structurally compromised church within sight of enemy observers.) All of which poses civil-military challenges that need to be exercised, especially in operational planning contexts.

**Rear**

We discussed how deep surveillance, reconnaissance and precision attack weapons were a facet of contemporary warfare that rendered the rear area a dangerous and uncertain space. Any part of the rear area too might feature the same challenges attending circumstances in which law and order has collapsed. Additionally, however, in favourable circumstances in which ‘our’ forces are advancing, the conduct of operations in the rear might at some foreseeable point permit cultural property first aid. We talked about how important it is to ensure the host nation takes the lead whenever circumstances allow, and therefore that the CIMIC goal of enabling the return to civilian governance as quickly as possible by capacity building – should embrace CPP too.

We heard how the anticipated consumption of combat supplies – notably ammunition and fuel, but also food and water – was today so great that a deployed Corps (nominally, say, 50,000 troops) requires a logistics maintenance area the size of a medium sized British town. Given modern population densities in Europe and some adversaries’ capability to conduct deep operations, survivability is dependent on dispersing logistics units in the urban sprawl. This poses unprecedented challenges for siting in relation to cultural property. The 1954 Convention establishes the concept of ‘adequate distance’ between cultural property and operational military entities. Written in the aftermath of the Second World War, well before the advent of precision attack capabilities, the Conventions references to targets including industrial centres, and to the wide area impact of ‘carpet’ bombing, are manifestly anachronistic. The concept of adequate distance is nevertheless valid. Quite what ‘adequate’ comprises (noting LOAC’s ‘proportionality’ and ‘distinction’ imperatives) is operational scenario dependent and is manifestly an issue to assessed and worked into rules of engagement during exercises. Military legal advisors have a singular role to play in shaping this environment alongside military planners and host nation representatives. Everyone involved in planning for CPP, not least military operational planners concerned with rear area operations, needs to understand how ‘adequate distance’ is to factored into planning. This implied task has never been exercised. It needs to be.

We discussed CPP in the context of maritime and cross-beach operations, noting that CPP below the high water mark also needs to be exercised.
Day 2: exercise content in counter insurgency and counter terrorism; peacekeeping and monitoring; and disaster relief

Counter insurgency (CI) and counter terrorism (CT).
We began by noting how operational dynamics in CI are entirely different from those discussed the previous day. In typical CI campaigns military operations comprise just one strand of the overall effort. The deployed force is usually dispersed throughout the area of operations. Principal tasks may comprise separating the insurgent from the population by dominating the terrain, denying the insurgent access to supplies, defeating the insurgent wherever they present a target, and contributing to wider initiatives to win ‘hearts and minds’, from remote rural communities to capital city. What has been termed ‘war among the people’ is a struggle to build consensus and to remove violence from politics. Campaigns may include lines of operation to tackle corruption and organised crime. The ‘host nation’ remains sovereign by default.

We discussed how state party cultural property inventories demanded by the 1954 Convention, while valid, may not be of great operational significance: local perceptions of value and importance (among the people) resonate more strongly. Furthermore, the indigenous insurgent actor is culturally very well placed to turn a deep understanding of what local people esteem to operational effect: cultural property can be as a weapon.

We discussed how UNESCO’s current emphasis on the 1972 World Heritage Convention was not helpful in the context of CI. The high cost of nomination and accession, and the values underpinning the World Heritage Site management regime, distanced the discourse on CPP from the socio-political concerns outlined above. War among the people placed a premium on the ‘understand’ function, not least the production of highly nuanced cultural property intelligence. We noted that this requires close collaboration with local heritage professionals and extensive dialogue with local people in environments in which failure to protect can have strategic consequences extending to major loss of life and an increase in insurgent support. Several people commented that methodologies did exist for estimating local value, including ICOMOS’ ‘spirit of place’ initiatives, and the UK National Trust’s address to associative value in the ‘special’, ‘unique’ and ‘cherished’ categories.

We noted that non-state insurgent actors in general were less likely to conform to LOAC and the 1954 Convention; attacking cultural property protected by instruments of the established rules-based international order being regarded as politically, morally, and rhetorically a valid course of action. Looting, rioting and low-level violence attending general unrest also posed heightened threats to cultural property in societies destabilised by insurgency, as did unchallenged systemic corruption in general and organised crime in particular.

We discussed how exercise scenarios should incorporate the above threat regime to enable the consequent estimation of vulnerability and risk, thereby factoring CPP planning challenges into exercises. These challenges include:

- Force posture and training. Is the implied task physically to guard cultural property more urgent, or necessary, in CI?
- In what circumstances might armed forces be deployed to provide wider in situ protection? What are the implied tasks? What equipment and training are required?
- Rules of engagement. Does the cultural property protection task necessitate specific RoE, given that the majority of threat actors are likely to be unarmed civilians – whatever their intent?
- How to build the host nation capacity to handle such tasks independently.
- How to build CPP into the anti-corruption programme. Corruption poses particular challenges because it may implicate those who are, to some extent or other, allied with us. Sometimes it is
difficult to talk about ‘sides’ in resource-poor environments where individuals habitually manoeuvre for every perceived social or economic advantage, or when individuals regard the beliefs and values of their community – or conversely of an entire region – more highly than the state’s bureaucratic authority.

- How to deliver support to initiatives to suppress illicit trafficking, especially across borders, to include cultural property. We briefly discussed the role military Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets might play in enhancing illicit trafficking intelligence, in support of a host nation’s security services, given adequate attention during campaign planning, noting that ISR operations on host nation territory require formal agreement extending to RoE.
- The potential for cultural property to be implicated in strategies that include systemic cultural cleaning.

ICRC pointed out that it has extensive experience reaching out to factions in challenging, complex environments. There is room for greater collaboration in the NGO community; Blue Shield has begun to work with Transparency International on NATO exercises, for example, and aspired to do something similar with ICRC.

Turning to CT: we noted that popular heritage sites have become attractive terrorist targets because they present large concentrations of people, especially in locations experiencing ‘over tourism’. The damage caused to the fabric of such sites by the wide variety of improvised explosive devices was not to be underestimated, and required specialist attention from the outset of first aid initiatives.

**Peacekeeping and monitoring.**

We reflected on KFOR’s experience in Kosovo since 1999, where the mission ‘to build a secure environment in which all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins, can live in peace’, included not only ‘the protection of patrimonial sites’, but also border security concerns, including the interdiction of cross-border smuggling activity. The KFOR mission offered an example of an effective stabilisation operation in which CPP was fully integrated. CPP was also a prominent component of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, where for a time RoE had included authority to use lethal force to protect cultural property. We noted that peacekeeping exercises should include operational planning against a mandate physically to guard cultural property, including in high-threat contexts with acute risk management challenges, provoking RoE, training, and equipment challenges.

We noted that UN peacekeeping CIMIC staff currently don’t get training in any of the three CPP pillars. We discussed training needs that, in the light of the previous workshop’s discussions, appear generic to all operational activity:

- Understand IHL as it applies to CPP, extending through to RoE considerations.
- Recognising the circumstances in which the mission of the peacekeeping force involves acting in the context of armed conflict in a manner that aligns the peacekeeping force with the interests of a belligerent party – in which case LOAC will apply to peacekeeping forces assigned to such tasks.
- Conduct a continuous estimate of threats, vulnerabilities and risk in order to set priorities and assign tasks to peacekeeping entities.
- Contribute to command, control and coordination activity.
- Recognise the need to train specialists, and engineers in particular, to work in circumstances in which local CPP experts are absent, emphasising the importance of employing reversible measures wherever possible.
- Promote capacity building. Where peacekeeping operations occur in the context of stabilisation, facilitate the return and empowerment of heritage professionals.
Peacekeeping typically necessitates long, slow-burn operations featuring multiple troop rotations. This posed continuity challenges, not least for monitoring tasks, where the training challenge includes detecting and recognising change, and accurate reporting.

All of which suggests multiple training objectives for peacekeeping CPP training.

**Disaster relief**

The conversation about disaster relief hinged on a discussion about whether armed forces should be regarded as a suitable, appropriate, or even necessary first response capability. State party armed forces typically are capable of rapid response employing their organic strategic (aircraft) and tactical (helicopters) lift. They bring:

- Unity of command (coherent/ balanced/ agile response)
- Communications assets capable of operating independently of terrestrial civilian infrastructure
- A work force capable of imposing the rule of law
- Specialist units, not least engineering and logistics, optimised for work in challenging environments

Peacekeeping doctrine nevertheless asserts that, while armed forces should be integrated into civil disaster planning, they should be the capability of last resort, on the grounds that they are fundamentally not primary crisis responders. Further, contemporary crisis typically attract an overwhelming global response, making for a very demanding coordination challenge, and placing undue stress on the shared enabling infrastructure.

We considered the temporal aspect of crisis response, noting that pre-crisis contingency planning provided a platform for the initial crisis response ‘understand’ (problem and mission analysis) phase, a crucial precursor to the rescue phase, which itself sequenced into the recovery phase (the equivalent of post-conflict stabilisation, discussed above). We noted that CPP must be integrated into pre-crisis contingency planning from the outset.

We observed that the conditions characterising vacuums in state party governance during crisis events posed the same risks as we discussed in the context of armed conflict, demanding a rapid response. We heard how the Austrian armed forces are fully integrated into national crisis planning: that CPP is always a factor, a legal framework exists, as do inventories and deployable CPP liaison officers. Decision making is devolved to the local level and enabled by thorough training, all of which facilitated rapid response and the conduct of high tempo operations when required, not least in relation to flood events in the Danube valley.

The new UK CPP Unit also aspires to respond rapidly to disaster relief operations. Recent UK experience during the hurricane season in the Caribbean saw ship-based British troops deploy immediately to provide a security framework as a precursor to the rescue phase. Understanding the CPP challenge proved difficult in the absence of pre-existing inventories, CPP specialist staff, and established local/regional contacts. The CPP unit will trained to conduct cultural property first aid reconnaissance activity during close and rear near-peer conflict operations. These skills closely match those required for rapid CPP response to disaster relief operations in the early recovery phase.

The Netherlands also plans to achieve early military CPP response in the Caribbean. We heard how civil/military planning includes the prepositioning of an ISO shipping container of CPP first aid stores at Curaçao as a component of its response plan.

We discussed ICCROM’s strong contribution to CPP first aid theory and its application. ICCROM runs its own courses and is available to deliver tailored packages to clients. Blue Shield acknowledged the primacy of ICCOM in the CPP first aid field, relative to its own complementary focus on proactive
protection for CPP in the event of armed conflict. Both required long-term strategic as well as operational planning and, as the UK CPP Unit’s aspirations demonstrate, there is synergy to be achieved by working in collaboration, not least in the delivery of training. ICCOM’s publications provide a very strong framework for the design and delivery of military specialist CPP training, to include CPP reconnaissance, first aid triage, and cooperation/coordination with host nation authorities, as well as NGOs.
Aim

The aim of the workshop was to share perspectives on designing and delivering CPP civil-military exercise content, building on collective training experience during recent command post and field training exercises in order to:

- Enrich future exercise scenarios such that CPP is encountered as a factor with true operational impact.
- Suggest individual training objectives relating to the training of staff officers with CPP responsibilities, and/or staff officers with some CPP training.
- Inform CPP doctrine development.

Context

States party armed forces are charged with safeguarding as much cultural property as possible during the conduct of armed conflict. This can only be achieved by safeguarding by design, factoring proactive safeguarding into operational plans; and putting in place measures to avoid damage and destruction before it occurs, mitigating, in particular, the anticipated effects of combat events, manoeuvre, and logistical activity.

Additionally, during stabilisation activity subsequent to combat operations; when functioning as the occupying power; and during ‘first responder’ disaster relief operations, armed forces may be tasked with contributing to cultural property ‘first aid’ conservation activities at the site of recent violent or catastrophic events, as well as supporting host nation, or occupied state party, efforts to suppress the illicit trade in cultural property. This too demands proactive planning. All of this must occur in collaboration with, or on behalf of, states parties owning the heritage in question, and always in a subordinate role, even when functioning as an occupying power.

The workshop advocated that taking a proactive stance to CPP has the potential to enhance operational effectiveness at all levels of command. In particular, well-judged CPP planning may promote freedom of manoeuvre, the maintenance of a chosen tempo of operations, and create conditions for positive STRATCOM opportunities: CPP should be regarded a mission enabler, not a drag on operational efficiency. However this is dependent on comprehensive civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), raising questions about how to factor CPP into individual and collective training, beyond general awareness.

The workshop comprised six syndicate discussions and feedback, aiming to draw out and share thematic content as well as lessons identified from the growing body of diverse experience in this emerging field:

1. Rear area
2. Close operations
3. Deep operations
4. Counter insurgency and counter terrorism
5. Peacekeeping and monitoring missions
6. Disaster relief

The workshop was organised by Dr Paul Fox, Blue Shield International and Newcastle University, and took place over two days. Attendees came from a diverse pool of experience, including Blue Shield staff; NATO CIMIC staff and HQ ARRC; British Army CPP and training staff; CPP staff from the USAF Culture...
and Language and Centre and the US Naval War College; the OSCE; the ICRC; heritage lecturers, students and practitioners (from maritime, site and collection-based backgrounds), and the Heritage in the Crossfire Project.

**Scenario Results**

Each scenario identified the timescale at which CPP various threats, operational challenges, and operations opportunities occurred at. These were considered in relation to potential missions, and assessed against LOAC and the 1954 Hague Convention and Protocols (particularly identifying areas where military convenience may replace necessity), in order to identify areas of potential weakness that could result from lack of planning and exercise of appropriate CPP command and control arrangements.

1. **Rear area**

   **Context:** Our rear area is the logistical support (food, ammunition, medicine, etc.) required to field the close divisions in a warfighting scenario. To put a single division into the field requires an area the size of a small city. The core (5 divisions) could require an area the size of a small country. Logistics and Engineering are the key divisions affecting the RA. The RA is where host nation support predominantly occurs, particularly regarding building protection.

   **Geographical area:** Extremely large; the area is unstable, and moves slowly forward (or back) concurrent with the forward line of own troops

   **Military Threats:** Potentially at risk from enemy long-range weaponry; use of special ops, hybrid and guerrilla fighting to disrupt logistics; accidental damage caused by logistical and engineering decisions.

   **Timescale:** May be relatively long-term

   **CPP threats (with examples of opportunities – these can be extrapolated to the other scenarios):**

   - **CIMIC officers** will have multiple competing demands on their time for host nation support, and may not have the specialist skill set required to deal with CP.
   - The scale of the RA creates a **command** challenge in where to deploy the limited CPP specialists most effectively, given the number of command posts in the RA
     - but can enable specialist input into command decisions.
   - The scale of the RA poses a **Logistics** challenge in where to situate key assets (ammunition dumps, command posts), requiring a knowledge of CP Locations, prioritisation and CP vulnerabilities that may not be available, and potentially opening the force up to accusations of violating IHL if assets are co-located with CP, unless the decision is demonstrably necessity, rather than inadequate planning.
     - Sensitive asset location can create conditions for positive host nation engagement
   - As the RA moves into a formerly close combat area, there will be extensive CP in need of first aid, and potentially a lack of local CP staff and materials, presenting a challenge for CIMIC, engineering, and CP staff.
     - Support can create conditions for positive host nation engagement, and positive IO
   - Potential for enemy messaging to local communities about CP use could present an **Information Operations** challenge
     - (or, if handled proactively, an opportunity)
   - Hybrid warfare may be used, disrupting logistics for CP (e.g. taking out a power station may affect a museum’s environmental controls), requiring CP support from CIMIC, CPP staff, engineering, etc.
   - Ideally CPP officers should be placed as highly as possible, but they may not have the rank to be actively included in planning at that level, also presenting a command challenge.
   - There are significant skill set and capacity challenges for limited CPP staff and CIMIC staff who may be required to:
support mission planning in stabilisation and transition  
- support mission planning in close operations from the RA  
- Go into the field and conduct CP host nation support (first aid, heritage staff support and engagement, intelligence collection, etc.)  
  - As the RA moves this creates a potential vacuum in which crime and looting can flourish, challenging CPP field officers, military police, and IO.  
    - Preventing illicit trafficking has the potential to enhance operational efficiency and HN support. Returning looted CP is always an IO success.  
- Although the RA is expected to move forward slowly, Iraq (2003) showed that it can move forward very quickly, leaving a major and significant vacuum in policing and heritage management (and all other areas).  
- The RA may also present a number of maritime challenges relating to underwater and coastal archaeology for logistics, beachheads, & movement of illicitly trafficked objects.  
- Different national RoE will present different challenges and opportunities for CP engagement.

**Training objectives:**
- **Logistics** and Engineering staff must understand the requirements of IHL regarding CP, in order to prepare operational plans that incorporate CP vulnerabilities, and evaluate and revise them if required.  
- CPP staff must understand the complex challenges of logistics planning in the rear area, and be able to prepare and revise plans that safeguard CP as needed  
- CPP staff may need to support targeting in conducting battle damage assessments  
- Junior staff of all divisions also need to understand the impact of CP in their daily duties – e.g. potential high value CP that might be targeted by looting to be checked on patrols, or identified in car searches, etc, and be able to apply the principles in their daily duties.  
- If relevant, staff planners must evaluate the roles and responsibilities of multinational forces, particularly regarding host nation support capacities, to develop effective CPP arrangements (e.g. policing, ability to use lethal force, and other national RoE)  
- All staff must understand and apply risk and risk mitigation strategies for CP in their area of responsibility, and understand the concept of command and control arrangements in place for CP in the AoR. CPP staff will need to evaluate existing arrangements and be prepared to revise them if necessary, particularly field staff.  
- LEGADs need to have analysed the requirements of LOAC and the HC’S4.  
- Commanders must understand CPP requirements under LOAC, and be able to estimate CP risk and evaluate the implications of CP damage, in order to prepare and revise operational plans accordingly.

**Suggested sample scenarios:**
- The State party Commissioner-General has appointed a CP Inspector, who would like to meet to discuss destruction of high value CP in your Rear Area.  
- A flat area has been selected as the site of a base and helipad. The national Ministry of Culture contacts you to express concerns about the choice of location, as it is a major underground archaeological site, and asks you to try and liaise with the site manager, who they have been unable to contact.  
- A senior command post has been located for some time in a former government building. An updated list of CP is acquired which states that this building is high value national CP.  
- During close operations, a known organised crime movement looted a number of major private art collections, including some world renowned pieces. On returning to their properties, the owners contacted a member of the CIMIC team asking for help, claiming the local police are corrupt – possible link to Transparency, etc.
• As the RA moves forward, a modern art museum with a number of large and strangely shaped sculptures is now within reach of the enemy weapons, and asks for help and advice about their collection.
• If the RA is particularly volatile, scenarios may mirror those used in counter-insurgency.
• Potential for maritime scenarios.
• A request for assistance from an informal IDP camp (good for collaborations with other humanitarian NGOs): An IDP camp would be devastating for the environmental impact on the area, which is CP. Scenario options to include? - the camp is degrading the local environment, and all the digging is altering the character of the environment; Refugees have also moved into the town and are damaging and making unauthorised repairs to the houses, and stone robbing from buildings, which is degrading the character of the town, and could cause it to lose its status after the conflict, which would devastate the towns economy, which is largely dependent on the UNESCO tourism; the local mayor wants them gone, although others on the local council are happy to keep them citing humanitarian / Christian duty; the local militia are presumably from the town, and would not want them gone?
• NATO staff / contactors accused of looting CP. This is both a STRATCOMM challenge, and an MP challenge – links to NATO reputation. Good practice would also include MPs etc setting up clear procedures for international follow up with relevant state party representatives and INTEPROL, etc.

2. Close operations

Context: Close operations covers an area of approximately 30 miles to each side of the forward line of Own Troops (FLOT) (i.e. the range of weaponry of each side) where the heavy front line fighting occurs. Operations occur at a very high tempo, and require rapid responses with minimal planning time. All staff remain bound by LOAC, but what is considered feasible may change. Close operations decisions are made quickly by lower level staff.

Geographical area: Relatively small (c. 60 miles wide), but highly unstable and constantly fluctuating.

Military Threats: Potentially at risk from long-range weaponry; targeting will use highly explosive dumb bombs, saving PMGs for high value targets; significant damage likely to occur from explosive weapons, bullets and shrapnel; the constantly fluctuating battle line can leave power and governance vacuums lasting 12-24 hours when looting and organised crime occur.

Timescale: Operations in any given area are likely to occur over a very short, high tempo timescale. However, the planning for these operations occurs far in advance over a much longer timescale.

CPP threats (Planning):
• Lack of proactive identification of CP and its vulnerabilities in the AoO could result in failure to mitigate threats during mission execution, resulting in increased damage and looting, negative PR, and antagonised populations
• CPP specialists may have not been able to brief troops going into theatre on CPP issues – a greater number of staff will be making command decisions in theatre and so require CPP awareness.
• Lack of identification of responsibility for CP issues in planning and in theatre. It is unlikely to be desirable or feasible for CP staff to operate during battle – what, if any – contingency plans have been made?

CPP threats (In theatre):
• The tempo of decision-making may make it tempting to dismiss CPP as ‘unfeasible’: commanders will be required to decide if this is convenience or necessity.
Kinetic operations will cause major damage to CP from Targeting and in-theatre troops. This can only be mitigated by significant planning beforehand from all staff divisions, factoring in the specific vulnerabilities of CP, and accounting for high value CP in weaponeering choices. 

In-theatre troops (particularly Engineering and Logistics) could also dig trenches in, or fill HESCO barriers with, archaeological soils.

The extensive damage is likely to create an international IO risk.

The rapidly fluctuating battle line leaves governance vacancies in which organised criminals and looting are extremely likely to occur, posing a challenge for commanders, CPP officers, and potentially military police. Co-locating at this point may shield military sites (potentially violating IHL), but conversely provide protection for cultural sites.

Lack of identified heritage professionals (on either side) to manage CP and conduct first aid.

Engineering and CPP Field Officers may be required to conduct emergency CP first aid, which they may not have been trained for, as heritage damage requires different skills to most buildings. However, this may be extremely risky in a volatile environment.

Training objectives:

- Troops operating in theatre understand how to mitigate CP risk according to its vulnerabilities, evaluating those vulnerabilities in their operations, and responding accordingly.
- Based on a comprehensive understanding of CPP, all staff should plan for the effects of close combat on CP, such as targeting; field troops; Logistics; command staff and planners; military police – to all proactively mitigate CP risk before fighting if possible. Decisions aids for quick decisions could be essential.
- Planning staff should be able to evaluate the risks posed by damage and destruction of CP during operations, and formulate strategies to deal with the consequences of high tempo kinetic operations.
- Staff should understand that with proactive planning, intelligence gathering, and development of CP strategies during planning, it is possible to mitigate some CP damage during high tempo operations, but virtually impossible without it.

Suggested sample scenarios (for mission execution):

- The Commissioner-General for Cultural Property informs you that they are concerned about a major museum in the enemy COA, which you expect to overrun shortly. You are informed that the museum has not been evacuated: instead its moveable contents were packed into the basement and are known to be safe, although the building has been lightly damaged. However, other museums containing similar objects have already been looted, and this one, which contains internationally significant objects, is considered to be at high risk. You are asked for your support to evacuate the collection, and to provide in situ protection for the large mosaics.
- A staff planner informs you that heavy fighting is expected to occur in a local town, at the centre of which is an old town with a high density of historic buildings considered to be of national importance.
- Intelligence reports the adversary is putting snipers in church towers overlooking major movement routes, causing significant problems for troop movement.
- In the advance, numerous reports have been received from GJ2, international police, etc, of increase in circulation of illegally acquired national CP, and incidents of looting; this should act as a red flag that looting is a high likelihood during any potential vacuum. (e.g. Police share x 3 reports with G2 of 1) increasing incidents of CP looting, 2) arson, and CP damage in AoR. 3) shipment of looted objects seized at port of <>. Police inform COM that they have reported the incident of the HN Ministry of Culture, who asked that COM be made aware to watch for more incidents, and assist in prevention if required.) TA to identify at risk CP, and consider whether to take steps to mitigate. Also applicable for REAR.
- Enemy have placed snipers in church / mosque towers along the advance routes and are hampering movement.
Or commander wants to place snipers in Church/mosque towers as part of movement advance. Can this be justified under LOAC (see 2016 Military Manual on military objectives).

- NATO staff accused of damaging significant CP deliberately with little military purpose. Reputational loss ensues. STRATCOMM challenge (even if there was a purpose, it may not be disclosed).
- Relevant Ministry of Culture writes to NATO Secretary General. They have received reports that NATO are deliberately using the sacred site <x> for siting of facilities to shield the location, contravening the 1954 Hague Convention. Ministry of Culture request the location be moved, and all locations be checked to ensure compliance with IHL.
- CPP crisis unfolding in key city in AOR as NATO Advance. COM will start receiving multiple pieces of evidence of a growing threat to CPP as they approach key city. This request should be added to the issues to consider by J9, ideally via convening a cross cutting CPP working group. Key person (Minister? Heritage Director?) will urge COM as the battlespace owner to fill the security vacuum developing in the city and occupy the key cultural property terrain, as elaborated earlier, at the earliest opportunity in order to prevent access by enemy proxies and organised criminal entities. Director will again urge COM to seal road and rail access to key borders to suppress illicit trafficking in cultural artefacts, citing recent experiences in Ukraine, Crimea and Georgia. Incident will develop NATOs understanding of the types of threats to CP in AoR, during operations, and after, and the role of CP in social tension. Highlight TA obligations: to take steps to deliver optimal CPP measures; and towards establishing a safe and secure environment.

3. Deep Operations

*Context:* Deep operations affect the enemy’s Rear Area. Targeting – bound by LOAC - is the key division affecting their Rear Area: kinetic damage is the most serious threat to CP. Deep operation decisions are made at very high levels, by commanders relying on trained specialist staff. There is significant overlap with Deep Operations and Rear Area Operations caused by the fluctuating area.

*Geographical area:* Extremely large; the area is unstable, and moves slowly forward (or back) concurrent with the forward line of own troops

*Military Threats:* Targeting (but potentially also disruption from hybrid warfare).

*Timescale:* Expected to have a long term presence

*CPP threats:*

- High level commanders may not have suitably trained CP staff
- Situating key assets (ammunition, command posts) in or by heritage sites.
  - In their RA it presents a threat to the heritage which much be taken into account by Targeting.
  - In our RA it presents a risk to the CP which must be considered by Logistics, but also makes own force vulnerable to accusations of shielding sites, which is prohibited under IHL unless required by military necessity (when it still presents a risk).
- Targeting operations occur at a high tempo: there may be a lack of ready/prepared Intelligence to identify key assets / high value targets for use in targeting decisions: CPP data collection is extremely time consuming
- If all CP sites in an area are known but not prioritised, this can present a targeting and logistics challenge.
- Enemy messaging to local communities in their rear area about CP targeting; or in ours about CP use could present an Information Operations challenge
- As the RA moves this creates a potential vacuum in which crime and looting can flourish, challenging CPP field officers, military police, and IO.
• Although the RA is expected to move forward slowly, Iraq in 2003 showed that it can move forward very quickly, leaving a major and significant vacuum in policing and management (and all other areas).
• Hybrid warfare may be used, disrupting logistics for CP (e.g. taking out a power station may affect a museum’s environmental controls – CP sites need to be factored into such decisions to manage risk).

Training objectives:
• CPP staff must understand the targeting process in order to appropriately judge advice on damage mitigation to high value targets
• Targeting staff must understand cultural property vulnerabilities, both social / community, and physical, and apply that knowledge to weaponeering choices, revising them as required
• Information Operations to understand and construct strategic messaging for CP (both protective and impact mitigation), and comms channels with SMEs on the opposing side (appropriate enemy staff, or independent appointees (e.g. the 1954 Hague Convention Mission of Control) )
• LEGADs need to have analysed the requirements of LOAC and the HC‘54.
• Commanders must understand CPP requirements under LOAC, and be able to estimate CP risk and evaluate the implications of CP damage, in order to prepare and revise operational plans accordingly.

Suggested sample scenarios:
• High value historic castle in a strategic location contains a gun battery that is targeting our lines. The castle overlooks a movement corridor and is also protecting a nearby town. It also has strong symbology in the local community, and was an important source of local revenue from tourists before the conflict.
• An important enemy command post has been placed in part of a UNESCO World Heritage Site, composed of multiple buildings of varying degrees of importance and age, and their surrounding fields. The decision has been made to target the command post. (If possible, make this a site of Enhanced or Special Protection).
• A lack of institutional command and control arrangements in the enemy rear area requires contact with local networks on the ground, to document existing damage, and provide them with advice and support for proactive mitigation.
• Although World Heritage Sites have been noted in the enemy RA, the provincial department for culture suggests that there is a significant amount of nationally high value CPP there for which there are no geo-coordinates, and asks if anything can be done.

4. Counter insurgency and counter terrorism

**Context:** An insurgency is defined as an organised armed rebellion by armed non-state actors (ANSAs) against a recognised state or authority involving the use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region: it is primarily a political struggle, in which both sides use armed force to create space for their political, economic and influence activities, but it can occur during war, occupation, or during internal conflicts. Counter-insurgency campaigns are comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes - occurs. Western states are usually deployed abroad to counter foreign insurgencies. Insurgencies are often characterised by the blurring of the line between civilian and combatant. Conversely, terrorism is, in the broadest sense, the use of intentionally indiscriminate violence as a means to create terror among masses of people; or fear to achieve a religious or political aim. It is not usually part of an organised insurgency. Armed forces may be deployed to assist in their home countries, but only in cases where the existing services cannot cope, which is rare.

**Geographical area:** Entire countries, but geographically diffuse, rather than sequentially mobile

**Military Threats:** Use of special ops, hybrid and guerrilla fighting, IEDs, kinetic force
**Timescale:** Ongoing, long term, with fluctuating threat level

**CPP threats (CI):**

- CP is frequently targeted or used in insurgency due to its perceived value to either global, national, local, or ethnic communities, or to the insurgents, and/or weak its security - creating major IO challenges at all levels, and potential community unrest.
- CI operations occur in an area where life carries on: museums are not evacuated, tourism locations stay open, and religious sites are still visited. All of these present civilian and CP targets. All staff must deal with the challenging tension between security and continuation.
- CPP Officers will face challenges in assisting in value identifications at the local level if they are deployed in command posts, and CIMIC and other field officers may lack specialist training to do so. Most armed forces are not operationally equipped and trained to incorporate CPP into a “hearts and minds” strategy.
- Significant site damage at sites that may have been economically or religiously important to local people pre-conflict can affect community relations, challenging CIMIC, and IO.
- Site protection may be perceived as voiding the neutrality of sites: significant host nation engagement by CIMIC and MPs with local security forces will be required, and there are major IO challenges.
- ANSAs are frequently unaware of IHL, and their obligations regarding CP: some (although by no means all) have indicated they are willing to respect it if they are aware of its requirements, offering potential comms issues, and a need to network with other NGOs who may be in a position to communicate with them (e.g. ICRC). Many have indicated a willingness to deliberately use protected CP to shield their assets, or to use them as vantage points.
- Logistics, Geo, and Engineering are usually unaware of CP in the AoR: there have been numerous cases of bases placed on or by heritage sites in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example. It is usually small sites that are affected, as staff lack the local expertise to identify sites on imagery that may have been left off “major” site lists.
- The security vacuum caused by the conflict enables archaeological site looting of unknown objects, which is frequently used to provide financial support to insurgents (amount and importance unknown); ANSAs may also target CP in military museums for use (e.g. guns, tanks). However, it can also be used to provide financial support for local communities in areas of decreasing economic opportunity.
- Looters range in scale from poor (unarmed) locals, to large (c. 200) well-armed, well-organised gangs that can present a wider security threat, and provide a significant contributor to organised crime, feeding into a global network.
- The scale of lootable sites in an AoR can make it highly challenging to tackle looting, as organised armed groups can simply move on to the next site when armed forces move in to tackle them.
- Not all armed forces can tackle looting under their RoE.
- During riots or local tension, CP is frequently targeted as a marker of the contested social order.
- A lack of information on site vulnerabilities could limit the ability to correctly identify risks and mitigate damage.

**CPP threats (CT):**

- CP is frequently targeted or used in terrorism due to its perceived value to either global, national, local, or ethnic communities, or to the insurgents, and/or weak its security - creating major IO challenges at all levels, and potential community unrest. However, armed forces are unlikely to be involved in planning the actual operation at the heritage location, but rather in wider security and stabilisation. All staff will require a general understanding of their CP responsibility at this time.

**Training objectives:**
• Those involved in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations need to understand the significance/value of heritage sites to adversaries and host nation (including diverse perspectives, e.g. gendered perspectives): this will enable assessments of why a site may be a potential target, and who the intended audience is, forming a challenge for command, intelligence, and comms. Strategies must be composed to affect / lessen the value to change the target, based on an evaluation of CP in the area.

• IO must understand the importance of messaging to protect local heritage and mitigate negative effects, and be able to plan proactive IO strategies based on an estimation of CP importance in the AoR.

• Command staff must plan to deploy CP officers to best effect over a wide geographic area, based on an assessment of the range of their responsibilities

• Staff involved in CT security need a general understanding of CP responsibilities and should be able to apply it in practice

Suggested sample scenarios:

• An ANSA has placed a command post in an un-evacuated museum
• Ground troops are deployed forwards in a CI operation: the only safe and secure building in the area to bunk down overnight is the un-evacuated provincial museum
• A local community leader comes forward to tell you that when building the FOB, your forces dug through ancient karez, a local irrigation system thousands of years old.
• Intelligence reports that a major religious shrine is expected to be targeted by insurgent forces. The shrines are managed by the Ministry of Religious Endowments, not the Ministry of Culture, and there are no relations between the two.
• Insurgent forces have set up a communications post in part of a World Heritage Site.
• A large armed gang of looters is operating at a network of major archaeological sites in your AoR. The money is thought to be funding the insurgency and contributing to organised crime. However, some site looting in your AoR is also being conducted by disparate locals who are not part of the gang, but who are also selling their finds to the crime network (to support their families).

5. Peacekeeping and monitoring missions

Context: Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas, and may assist ex-combatants in implementing peace agreement commitments that they have undertaken. Such assistance may come in many forms, including confidence-building measures, power-sharing arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of law, and economic and social development. Accordingly, deployments can include soldiers, police officers, and civilian personnel. Although most peacekeepers are deployed by the UN, the European Union and African Union have also deployed peacekeepers, and NATO have been deployed on peacekeeping missions (with UN agreement). The specific Mandate is crucial for determining the responsibilities and type of the deployment and the rules of engagement, but generally speaking: the UN’s Model Agreement that Mandates are based on includes observation of the “Principles and Spirit” of the 1954 Hague Convention (although as an organisation, not a State, they are not legally obliged to do so, unless the State they are a part of is a signatory); the increasing focus of UNSCRs on CP destruction suggests the potential for increasing use in Mandates; force is only permitted in self-defence and for the duration of a situation, and peacekeepers must abide by IHL when force is used. In situations not relating to self-defense, human rights law may take precedence, prohibiting use of force to protect property.

Geographical area: The AoR varies depending on the mandate, but it is large, and geographically stable.

Military Threats: Threats faced are likely to be similar to both counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism: Use of special ops, hybrid and guerrilla fighting, IEDs, (some) kinetic force.
Timescale: Long term, slow tempo operations requiring both short term planning immediately post deployment, and long-term planning

CPP threats:

- CPP and CIMIC officers are not usually deployed on P&M missions, so CPP may not be taken into account. CPP is heavily dependent on deployed civilians, and perhaps police. As a result, lines of responsibility may be very hard to identify.
- CP is frequently targeted or used in the insurgencies peacekeepers are deployed to monitor due to its perceived value to either global, national, local, or ethnic communities, or to the insurgents, and/or weak its security - creating major IO and protection challenges at all levels, and potential community unrest that – at its worst - can destabilise peacekeeping processes.
- Operations occur in an area where life carries on: museums are not evacuated, tourism locations stay open, and religious sites are still visited. All of these present civilian and CP targets. All staff must deal with the challenging tension between security and continuation.
- CP is likely to be at greatest risk, or to have been threatened or damaged, before or immediately after initial deployment: failure to protect CP can result in the force being perceived as “weak”, distanced from the needs of the community they are there to support, and can contribute to community instability. There are major intelligence and policing challenges in rapid identification of at-risk CP in local communities, and in identification of local host nation support (both in security and first aid).
- The targeting of significant heritage of a particular ethnic group or community can act as an indicator of increasing civil tension: failure to monitor CP in intelligence gathering may miss crucial early indicators of the potential for localised renewed violence.
- In the immediate post deployment period, the security vacuum caused by the conflict is likely to result in increased looting of museums, archaeological sites and organised crime, potentially funding possible insurgency, but also to combat poverty at the local level in the absence of other economic opportunities.
- Host nation engagement should include Borders and Customs training to identify looted objects, and such training may also be required for deployed troops / police engaged in, for example, car searches.
- The integrated nature of the team may result in information sharing and prioritisation challenges, as those involved in information collection are unlikely to be those deployed: significant host nation engagement will be required with culture staff.
- Host nation support in these areas may be unavailable because of the conflict: staff must be identified with responsibility for including CP in a governance review, and appropriate plans made if no cultural staff or policing / security are available.
- Significant site damage at sites that may have been economically or religiously important to local people pre-conflict can affect community relations, challenging Police, and IO.
- If first aid is required to mitigate CP damage, deployed personnel need to be aware of available SMEs and have planned appropriately for when to access them: for example, heritage buildings require a different skillset to traditional buildings, posing an engineering challenge. Appropriate staff must be identified in planning with the responsibility for arranging SMEs, and identifying the trigger points to contact them.
- Site protection may be perceived as voiding the neutrality not only of sites, but also of the mission: significant host nation engagement with local security forces will be required, and there are major IO challenges.
- Longer term challenges include developing community relations to encourage local site protection, supporting Ministries of Culture to protect and reopen sites as needed, training them in identification and mitigation of security threats in unstable situations (training they are very unlikely to have received previously), and continuing to prevent looting and illicit trafficking.
- The Mandate and RoE are crucial in
Training objectives:

- An integrated deployment needs to include CPP in all areas of the deployment: staff must be identified with responsibility for planning and implementing CPP and coordinating it across the deployment, and those staff must be able to evaluate the CPP needs in the AoR, and propose plans accordingly.
- Those involved in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations need to understand the significance/value of heritage sites to adversaries and host nation (including diverse perspectives, e.g. gendered perspectives): this will enable assessments of why a site may be a potential target, and who the intended audience is, forming a challenge for command, intelligence, and comms. Strategies must be composed to affect / lessen the value to change the target, based on an evaluation of CP in the area.
- Staff involved in CT security need a general understanding of CP responsibilities and should be able to apply it in practice.

Suggested sample scenarios:

- Cultural property has been extensively and deliberately targeted by both sides during the preceding conflict. Host nation security forces have been decimated, and one aspect of the Mandate is to assist in providing security. The host nation requests support guarding a number of significant religious sites of one side in the conflict.
- Violence has resurfaced between the warring parties, there is a significant ethnic component. One of the groups has been targeting a highly culturally significant bridge for most of a day: it is no longer usable, but the shelling continues. A representative of the Ministry of Culture tells you this is an ethnically based attack and begs for help (and threatens to go to UNESCO if it is not stopped).
- Intelligence has determined that insurgents are using looted antiquities from archaeological sites to finance purchase of weaponry. Very few government utilities still have local guards as there has been no money to pay them: cultural sites are also expected to face the same shortfalls.
- A timber cultural property of great significance to the local community has been destroyed: the Ministry of Culture asks for technical support for rebuilding.

6. Disaster relief

Context: Armed forces are deployed in diplomatic missions to provide disaster risk reduction advice; under the Oslo Guidelines, military personnel are only deployed in disaster relief operations as a last resort when existing response staff are unable to cope: they are only deployed at the request of the (local or national) government, and are there to provide support – primarily logistical and engineering support and occasionally security. In many countries, armed forces are the only organisation with the necessary resources to help in disasters.

Geographical area: Localised in the disaster area

Military Threats: None

Timescale: Extremely short, rapid response, high tempo operation with general planning for disaster situations, but minimal planning possible for the specific context.

CPP threats:

- CP is highly likely to have been damaged in the disaster, but CPP is likely to be treated as a luxury, not a need.
- The primary role of armed forces is to coordinate logistics, which should include both accounting for existing CP in rescue operations, and supporting CPP responders. Situation assessments should include availability of appropriate skills, resources, and existing triage plans.
- Decision making (of necessity) occurs very quickly: CPP must be accounted for from the outset.
• Extensive CP damage occurs when CP is cleared too quickly from damaged areas to either create access, or remove buildings deemed to be unstable with checking the contents. Coordination with all areas of disaster response is required.

• There are challenges in identifying appropriate national and international support, and there is likely to be an information vacuum on CP in the area. Even in countries with good inventories, significant information vacuums may develop due to power loss, and inaccessibility of buildings with physical records.

• Armed forces may be called in to assist in urgent stabilisation, and evacuation / recovery of CP from damaged structures (e.g. in Nepal): however, not all heritage staff have received emergency evacuation training. Planning must include appropriate lines of communication to international experts in the event the host nation requires aid.

• There will be major challenges in prioritising responses: host nation consultation with both heritage staff and local communities is essential.

• In addition to disaster response, disaster risk reduction is likely to be a key field for CPP deployments: in addition to extensive skills in planning, CP Officers will also require First Aid skills, and DRR skills, perhaps resulting in skillset gaps.

Training objectives:
• Disaster relief planning staff should be able to
  o include an appraisal of CPP needs, evaluated against other needs
  o propose CPP disaster relief plans
  o organise CPP support based on CPP assessments
  o to revise CPP plans as needed

• Logistics and Engineering staff must understand the CP requirements, in order to prepare and plan support that incorporates CP vulnerabilities, and evaluate and revise plans if required.

Suggested sample scenarios:
• A major museum has collapsed in an earthquake: armed forces are requested to aid in evacuating its contents

• You are in charge of logistics, and deploying armed forces equipment to aid humanitarian responders. A number of collapsed cultural heritage buildings and churches lie along a proposed access route that is about to be cleared with bulldozers. A heritage responder comes to you and pleads for more time: the buildings contain ancient frescoes that can be saved if they only have time to remove them safely.

• You are the CPP officer with responsibility for cultural assistance after a disaster. The armed forces of a different nation are coordinating inbound responder flights at the airport and have deemed the international cultural response team a low priority: it will be at least 36-48 hours before they reach you. The capital city has been particularly badly hit; with several national museums (art, archaeology, and the national library) all affected.

• An earthquake has rocked the capital city and, like everything else, cultural heritage has been seriously affected. Both the disaster list of CP locations, and its backup are inaccessible due to power loss, and the paper records are stored in a building in an area that local heritage staff have been forbidden to access due to structural safety concerns. They ask for your help in identifying and triaging affected CP.

Conclusions

The diverse experiences of the workshop attendees resulted in deep and complex discussions covering a wide range issues. The participants evaluated CP risk in a multiple scenarios, identifying significant threats faced by CP in armed conflict and disasters, many of which can have a negative operational impact if armed forces are unprepared. NATO has correctly identified CPP as a “cross-cutting theme” —
decisions taken by staff in all divisions and at all levels can affect or mitigate CP risk, posing a significant command challenge. However, there are multiple opportunities for CPP – when proactively factored into mission planning – to act as a mission enabler. Nonetheless, several notable challenges repeat in each scenario.

The first is the consequences of failing to incorporate CP into mission planning at all levels. Successful incorporation of proactive CPP & risk management into mission planning is highly challenging, and must be exercised with staff from all divisions.

- Not all divisions (e.g. logistics) are familiar with the CP requirements of IHL, and there is potential for both own armed force illegal action, and damaging community relations.
- In a large scale and/or high tempo operation, it will not always be possible to protect all CP. The nebulous boundary between military necessity and convenience is one that requires practice to assess, and whilst it is entirely dependent on the context of the time, the issues likely to be faced can – to some extent – be predicted to gain a better idea of what is feasible.
- Early host nation engagement is vital – armed forces are either present on behalf of a host nation; or aiming to hand a state back to them at mission conclusion, and host nations are best placed to provide the SMEs, resources, and local intelligence required for detailed mission support. The Ministry of Culture should be included as an actor in scenarios.
- Exercises must include different operational timescales, which can significantly alter the nature of the CPP challenge, to allow for the development of different approaches.

The second key challenge is the intelligence gap.

- CP data is highly complex, and has so far been largely restricted to geo-coordinates. However, the scale of CP issues armed forces may be required to incorporate extends far beyond targeting, and operations of all types can be enhanced by additional information, particularly relating to site vulnerabilities. However, such data has not – to date – been considered a priority.
- There is a clear tension in the level of planning required to collect adequate CP information. CP data collection is extremely time consuming and best conducted with (civilian?) SME support: however, the majority of operational is conducted at SECRET level until the latest stages, when civilians can be brought in to advise. At this stage, it may be too late. In addition, host nation SMEs are likely to focus on CP of national significance: intelligence staff may need to collect data on locally significant CP based on consideration of current operational plans.
- It may not be possible to identify significant community CP until troops are in theatre.
- Exercises must include the variety of challenges posed by collection of adequate CP data to encourage operational planning timescales to factor this in accordingly. CP data collection will need to be considered alongside the prioritisation of other key information: when resources are strained, conscious decisions must be made about what data will not be collected, based on an evaluation of which parts of the mission will be affected without it.

The final challenge highlighted by the workshop is the skillset required to conduct effective CPP, and the role of CIMIC and CP Officers.

- A generalist understanding of CPP issues is necessary for all divisions, and at all levels, as troops in-theatre will make decisions that affect CP, as well as command staff engaged in planning.
- However, CPP activities themselves require specialist skillsets that fall into two areas.
  - Planning: Staff with CPP responsibility are expected to contribute CP perspectives during planning, providing overviews of all the factors to be considered in all potential operations, including close operations, stability and transition, counter-insurgency, and potentially disaster relief, in order to advise on CP risk mitigation strategies. Staff in this capacity will require an overview of the tasks and functioning of all divisions, and will have a major role in supporting planning. Commanders will need to carefully consider
where best to place CP planning staff to best effect, given they are a limited resource, and they will require access to senior command planning in order to feed into all divisions.

- Comprehensive training is required in the responsibilities, limitations, and activities of all divisions.
- CP and CIMIC staff with CP responsibility are not traditionally highly-enough ranked to be given serious consideration at high level planning meetings.

Field Operations: There are also a significant number of field operations requiring CP input. Staff may be required to: support on-the-ground intelligence gathering and information prioritisation (particularly value assessments); conduct host nation engagement with government departments, cultural staff on the ground, and communities; provide on-site CP support (e.g. museum evacuation); carry out on-site damage assessments, site triage, and first aid; advise on CP mitigation strategies to host nation; coordinate own-force and/or host nation logistical CP support on the ground; incorporate CP into ‘hearts and minds’ strategies; and advocate for CP with in-theatre troops before deployment, amongst others.

- This is a different specialist skillset to supporting planning; and one which few staff (particularly CIMIC staff) are adequately trained to comprehensively cover.
- Urgent first aid is required in highly dangerous circumstances: careful consideration should be given to whether it is appropriate to deploy staff with this skillset at these times.

CP duties also change in the required skillsets depending on the timescale and area of the operation: immediate post-deployment needs are significantly different to long-term deployments, and vary depending on where in the battlespace staff are deployed.

Overall, the CP risk evaluation conducted by the workshop participants was highly productive, synthesising the diverse range of participant experience, and resulting in a number of proposed training objectives that could mitigate the identified risk; participants also proposed a number of (brief) scenarios that could be developed to exercise these training needs, forming a basis from which those involved in CPP can develop a suite of best-practice conduct for the incorporation of successful CPP during operations, enhancing operational effectiveness at all levels of command and on the ground.

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