Exercise Trident Jackal 2019
Report

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1. Executive Summary

Context

1.1 Trident Jackal 2019 (TRJA19) was a Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation sponsored, operational-level exercise to train, evaluate and support the certification of HQ NRDC-Spain as a Joint Taskforce Headquarters (JTF HQ), based upon a fictitious, non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation scenario, dubbed as SKOLKAN 2.

1.2 The exercise was designed and delivered by NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), who invited Blue Shield International as subject matter experts (SMEs) in cultural property protection, a NATO cross-cutting theme, alongside other NGOs.

1.3 Not including preparation time or travel, BSI contributed 26 days to the exercise. In addition, the BSI Vice-President attended two days of the exercise in Menorca as an observer.

Training goals

1.4 At present, NATO has no CPP doctrine to train against. Therefore, continuing to work out of core NATO publications, BSI takes the approach that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols (1954 and 1999) provides the core fundamental framework for NATO to realise CPP activities, in both international and non-international armed conflict.

1.5 Building on a year of NATO exercises, BSI’s goal remained: to generate just enough cultural heritage content to prompt a small number of HQ-level challenges that would engage the TA with the issues relating to the core structural pillars of the 1954 Hague Convention.

Scenario Development

1.6 Although the Skolkan 2 scenario lacks any state party infrastructure for cultural heritage or its management, White Cell support enabled BSI to represent the Deputy Minister (Culture) for the Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth, and Sport.

1.7 CPP was not realised as a cross-cutting issue during scenario development, leading to inconsistencies within the scenario, and gestural initial cultural development.

1.8 BSI’s primary story lines took place within NATO’s Protection of Civilians agenda; but BSI also continued to build on our developing relationship with Transparency International UK to develop collaborative storylines with synergistic effects as part of NATO’s Building Integrity agenda. In total, BSI wrote and ran three CPP storylines, and contributed to a TI storyline, as well as providing ad hoc support for the Women, Peace, and Security work.

Exercise

1.9 Cultural heritage protection training objectives must reflect individual training levels. This makes for a training challenge for exercise writers and requires careful event/incident scripting. In this case, with only minimal training amongst the TA, BSI also provided a one-hour mentoring session, with the full encouragement of the JWC Evaluation team, in order to enable deeper engagement with CPP obligations.
However, in many respects, the TA performed admirably and are to be commended, demonstrating what CPP good practice should look like for NATO. Examples included:

a) CPP awareness raising for all staff
b) Detailed engagement with the cultural information domain to support in-depth, cross-branch activity
c) Understanding and activation of the Organisation of Control (that is - the control arrangements for cultural sites organised between the Ministry of Culture and NATO), exemplified in close coordination with the host nation.
d) Creation of a cross-cutting CPP working group attended by all branches dedicated to tackling CPP issues
e) Strong LEGAD engagement with the 1954 Hague Convention, Protocols and Regulations, providing the framework for ensuing NATO activity
f) Consideration of the use of the distinctive emblem and apparatus of control to support the Organisation of Control
g) Growing awareness of the symbolic power of CPP as a target, in addition to its strategic value
h) Initial preparation for future CPP as NATO advanced into a new AoR, recognising that cultural heritage is especially at risk during transitional operational phases

However, NATO generally regards combat as the ultimate measure of performance. During 2018, BSI found that there was a tendency to “regard non-kinetic issues, such as the protection of civilians, cultural heritage protection, and host nation opinion as picturesque scenery that had to be acknowledged, but must not be allowed to present significant challenges demanding close attention by headquarters staff”\(^1\). This issue remains and is, in part, due to a lack of doctrine, resulting in – at best – a modest level of training. Most of the TA (and plenty of EXCON) have never had cause to engage with CPP and the 1954 Hague Convention.

Awareness training alone does not provide sufficient understanding / knowledge to enable best practice in staff planning and operations, where CPP is most relevant, and initially resulted in a failure to comprehend the extent and depth of CP obligations in TA operational conduct and host nation engagement.

This manifested as:

a) A clear reluctance to engage with the Ministerial representative for Culture, and so with the legal obligations of the TA, without significant pushing from several areas of EXCON (from both Ministerial levels within the scenario, and from Evaluation team).
b) A failure to recognise and prepare for CPP as part of NATO's Protection of Civilians agenda, and as a component of the civilian and NGO space.
c) A partial failure to address CPP as a cross-cutting topic, with some branches initially failing to acknowledge their CPP responsibilities and dedicate collaborative attention to it in a busy battlespace.
d) A failure to share relevant information both within branch and across, indicating CPP was not seen as a priority across the TA, but an issue only for those directly and clearly tasked with dealing with it.

- NATO branches were unprepared to include CP as a factor in the civilian space.
- No intelligence assessment had been conducted on risk to heritage – or to heritage staff. Despite a week-long series of incidents placing CP at risk and a host-nation risk assessment shared and discussed with NATO, when pushed J2 declared there to be “no risk” to CP or CP staff. In a real situation, this could

result in civilians failing to take precautions and being placed at risk, and an unmitigated risk to CP.

- This was also apparent in NATO’s management of a possible investigation into looted objects, which was hindered by failure to share information within and across branches.

e) A failure to recognise and manage CP as a significant Information Operations Challenge, resulting in reputational damage to NATO, and a diplomatic incident with the host nation at Ministerial level.

f) A failure to recognise the requirement for NATO to share CPP information and proactively coordinate with the Ministry of Culture when issues relating to CPP were under discussion (e.g., LEGADs, Military Police, Info Ops).

g) In addition, the lack of a clearly defined Ministry of Culture in the scenario led to confusion amongst the TA about the training support BSI was there to provide, with (not unreasonable) assumptions about BSI’s ability (as the Deputy Minister (Culture) for the Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport) to provide scenario information regarding child soldiers (Youth), and cultural and societal information from cultural locations across the setting, which was not possible.

1.14 A targeting incident was scripted that would place high payoff targets on cultural property, initially scripted on the World Heritage site, and then – as the exercise progressed – this was moved to a fictional archaeological site. The MoC insisted on the right to “red card” NATO targeting decisions if cultural property consultation did not occur. Although TA decisions during exercise meant it was not possible to play the targeting script, its creation, in no small part thanks to EXCON support, demonstrated the value that cultural subject matter expertise can bring to targeting, and indicated a possible route by which such discussions could occur whilst retaining the classified nature of targeting boards.

**Overall Lessons Learned and Lessons Identified**

1.15 The lessons are detailed in Section 7, on page 21. However, in summary, the key lessons learned and identified for future action are:

a) NATO must identify collective training objectives for CPP at the outset.

b) There is a clear need for NATO CPP doctrine:
   i. Such doctrine should work out of the 1954 Hague Convention. It provides an overarching framework for the conduct of CPP within a military mission, against which hard decisions can be made.
   ii. This in turn enables collective training objectives for NATO to train against.

c) This should influence then setting design and exercise realisation: the setting must include a detailed civil environment including a separate Ministry of Culture, which should be engaged with and respected as a stakeholder in its own right.

d) TRJA19, like TRJA18, did not contain a prioritised list of cultural property inventory, a situation sadly reflective of the real world, although there was a (culturally brief) No-Strike list. NATO, and especially its Member States, must invest in the collection and provision of CPP data, both real and on exercise, if it wants to train its cross-branch CPP obligations.
e) CPP should be played from the outset, to include host nation liaison/ intelligence sharing during and after the OLRT in order to frame the subsequent exercise goals.

f) There is a vital need to exercise CPP in Article 5 scenarios. The 1954 Hague Convention remain no less valid during warfighting although the constraints of LOAC may be evaluated differently.

g) Detailed CPP is a specialist activity, requiring specialist training and dedicated staff officers.

Acknowledgements

BSI particularly valued the support received from the JWC and the Exercise Evaluation Team, who continued to take a close interest in the CPP learning, but also from the EXCON team more widely. Their support was vital and enriched both our participation and the learning outcomes for the TA, and we thank them for it.
## 2. Contents

1. Executive Summary ................................................................................................................ 2  
   Context ................................................................................................................................... 2  
   Training goals .......................................................................................................................... 2  
   Scenario Development ......................................................................................................... 2  
   Exercise ................................................................................................................................. 2  
   Overall Lessons Learned and Lessons Identified .............................................................. 4  
   Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 5  
2. Contents .................................................................................................................................. 6  
3. Context .................................................................................................................................... 7  
4. BSI Approach and Goals for CPP Training ........................................................................... 9  
5. Exercise Framework and Storyline Realisation ................................................................. 11  
   Scenario ............................................................................................................................... 11  
   Training ................................................................................................................................. 11  
6. Exercise .................................................................................................................................. 14  
   Storyline 1 – Host Nation Engagement (introduction to legal obligations) ...................... 16  
   Storyline 2 – Damage at church: NATO blamed (Impact of media on operations) .......... 17  
   Storyline 3 – Host nation support for in situ protection ...................................................... 18  
   Storyline 5 – Targeting ....................................................................................................... 19  
   Storyline – Other: Transparency International .................................................................. 20  
7. Overall Lessons Learned and Lessons Identified ........................................................... 21  
   Doctrine and Training ......................................................................................................... 21  
   Scenario ............................................................................................................................... 21  
   Future Activity ..................................................................................................................... 22  
   Blue Shield’s Perspective .................................................................................................... 23  
8. Core Publications and Frameworks ..................................................................................... 24  
9. Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................... 24  
   Annex 1 – Letter to TA to establish relations with Ministry of Culture ............................... 25  
   Annex 2 – Letter requesting in situ protection and risk assessment .................................. 28
3. Context

3.1 Trident Jackal 2019 (TRJA19) was a Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation sponsored, operational-level exercise to train, evaluate and support the certification of HQ NRDC-Spain as a Joint Taskforce Headquarters (JTF HQ).

3.2 The two-level (operational and tactical) exercise was based upon a fictitious, non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operation scenario, dubbed as SKOLKAN 2. A non-article 5 setting is one whereby "the Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened".

3.3 The exercise involved NRDC-Spain planning and conducting a Small Joint Operation with limited complexity, against insurgents contesting NATO. The training audience (TA) were exercised in critical tasks within an Allied Operation in a setting reflecting an early phase of an operation (deployment of the Joint Task Force HQ and Joint Logistic Support Group to the crisis area).

3.4 NATO’s Training Objectives for TRIDENT JACKAL 2019 included, but were not limited to, the following:

- effective Command and Control of NATO Forces in theatre;
- timely and effective decision-making through coordinated staff processes;
- impact assessment of military operations on civil environment;
- Strategic Communications;
- theatre logistics;
- force protection and joint fires and targeting.

3.5 As it was collective training, evaluation was carried out at the HQ level.

3.6 The exercise was designed and delivered by NATO’s Joint Warfare Centre (JWC), who invited Blue Shield International as subject matter experts (SMEs) in cultural property protection, a NATO cross-cutting theme (that is, one that affects all nine branches).

3.7 Between 31 August and 22 September 2019, more than 1,000 soldiers, 113 vehicles, 30 trailers and 120 containers deployed to the Island of Menorca to support the exercise. Overall, a total of 24 countries took part in the exercise as participants, evaluators and observers².

² For more information on Trident Jackal, see
3.8 The JWC provides the core of the EXCON (Exercise Command), including the Situation Centre, the Opposing Forces, CAX operators, the Grey Cell and media simulation. EXCON is also augmented by participants from other NATO commands, additional external sources as well as governmental institutions and non-governmental organizations. BSI was part of this team. In total, EXCON expended almost 37,000-man hours of work, allowing the Training Audience to achieve their 14 Training Objectives and more than 130 Supporting Tasks.

3.9 BSI attended alongside other NGOs / SMEs, including the ICRC and Transparency International. The storylines developed were cross-cutting, and required the training audience to adopt a cross-cutting approach to respond. In addition, by working with other NGOs, in particular Transparency International, we were able to enrich the scenario to provide a more in-depth, realistic, training experience that better reflected the cross-cutting nature of the issues in reality.

3.10 During the exercise, BSI was part of the EXCON “White Cell” - a group of some 20 highly experienced NATO contractors employed to replicate state party stakeholders, including the ministries of: defence; foreign affairs; security; public order; internal affairs, as well as third party regional actors. The White Cell coordinated its activities under JWC control, in an open, collaborative environment. This included twice daily coordination meetings between the White Cell and the JWC, to coordinate player interaction and collect feedback. All positions demanded a high degree of subject matter expertise as well as sufficient exposure to/experience of military culture in order to be able to relate to and engage with a large headquarters planning a complex mission at a high tempo.

3.11 For BSI, exercise support consisted of scripting several storylines (each made up of incidents) for the Training Audience (TA), designed to exercise specific aspects of CPP. These events are written at Main Events List (MEL)/Main Incidents List (MIL) and realised during the exercise, such as meeting with the TA roleplaying as the Minister of Culture to develop understanding of CPP obligations to a host nation during conflict. The Exercise environment also allowed social media play on simulations of Facebook and Twitter to build the context of the scenario. Recognising cultural heritage issues are highly newsworthy, in addition to the media issues they generated, the White Cell Media team also facilitated commentary on social media of CPP issues, enabling BSI to undertake dynamic comments on two social media accounts.

3.12 Storylines were also supported by a one-hour mentoring session with the TA during the exercise.

Figure 1: NRDC Spain temporary exercise HQ for Trident Jackal 2019.
3.13 BSI’s primary storyline took place within NATO’s Protection of Civilians agenda; but BSI also continued to build on our developing relationship with Transparency International UK to develop collaborative storylines with synergistic effects as part of NATO’s Building Integrity agenda. In total, BSI wrote and ran three CPP storylines, and contributed to a TI storyline, as well as providing ad hoc support for the Women, Peace, and Security work.

3.14 BSI particularly valued the support received from the JWC and the Exercise Evaluation Team, who continued to take a close interest in the CPP learning, but also from the EXCON team more widely. Their support was invaluable and enriched both our participation and the learning outcomes for the TA.

3.15 One member of BSI staff attended the (ARRC) academics for five days, with another attending for two days. Two members of BSI attended the MEL/MIL scripting for three and half days in JWC, Stavanger, followed by a further six days exercising NRDC-Spain in Menorca, Spain. Not including preparation time or travel, BSI contributed 26 days to the exercise. In addition, the BSI Vice-President attended two days of the exercise in Menorca as an observer.

4. BSI Approach and Goals for CPP Training

4.1 At present, NATO has no CPP doctrine to train against. Therefore, continuing to work out of core NATO publications, BSI takes the approach that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two Protocols (1954 and 1999) provides the core fundamental framework for NATO to realise CPP activities, in both international and non-international armed conflict.

4.2 The major cultural heritage protection lesson of TRJR18 was that NATO’s contributing nations must teach and exercise cultural heritage protection as an operational implied task during command and staff training if NATO is to realise its aspiration to develop cultural heritage protection best practice on operations. This lesson has been reiterated during BSI attendance on further exercises, and continues to inform our approach.

4.3 Cultural heritage protection was not built into either the general scenario, or specifically into Trident Jackal, and therefore did not inform exercise development from the outset. Building on a year of NATO exercises, BSI’s goal remained: to generate just enough cultural heritage content to prompt a small number of HQ-level challenges that would engage the TA with the issues relating to the core structural pillars of the 1954 Hague Convention.

a) Preparatory peacetime pillars:
   - Designation of competent authorities responsible for safeguarding (the so-called Organisation of Control)
   - Preparation of inventories
   - Planning of emergency measures for protection against fire and structural collapse
   - Preparation for the removal of movable CP or the provision of adequate in situ protection

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b) Executive armed conflict pillars:
   - Activation of the Organisation of Control
   - Application of safeguarding measures for cultural property in the Special Protection and Enhanced categories
   - Transportation of Cultural Property in the Special Protection category
   - Use of the Distinctive Emblem

Figure 2: The Executive Pillars of the 1954 Hague Convention

4.4 Many States Parties have failed to realise the former, and the latter are dependent upon them. However, in order to fully exercise NRDC-Spain, BSI teaches the role that Ministries of Culture should play as a States Party Competent Authority, and roleplays them on exercise. Given the limited mentoring/teaching time available, a reasonable amount of proactive preparatory safeguarding is assumed to have been undertaken.

4.5 It should be stressed that if the competent authorities are unprepared for armed conflict and have not prepared emergency measures, this does not relieve NATO of its obligations relating to CP in armed conflict, but it does excessively complicate them. That likelihood (realistic as it may be) cannot be effectively exercised whilst realising comprehensive CPP training outcomes within the existing training scenario. Nor would this be the correct time to do so: undertaking such activity requires highly specialised training.

4.6 In this context, BSIs training objectives were:
   a) To supplement any CPP Awareness Training NATO staff have received, developing understanding of the legal obligations underlying CPP, framed within LOAC;
   b) To develop awareness of, understand, and apply the 1954 Hague Convention’s Regulations and Protocols (1954, 1999) in support of host nation CPP activities;
   c) To conform to, participate in, and complement where necessary, the Host Nation CPP safeguarding plan, including its command and control arrangements;
   d) To realise CPP as a cross-cutting activity with relevance and impact across all branches;
e) To make an operational case for prioritising selected CPP tasks, and prepare a COMM briefing;
f) To develop understanding of and engagement with CPP in the INFO OPS domain.

5. Exercise Framework and Storyline Realisation

Scenario

5.1 The training scenario is designed to be of limited complexity, and BSI recognises this.

5.2 Nonetheless, cultural issues previously have generally been subsumed into other ministries, such as the Ministry of Public Order, resulting in underdeveloped, gestural engagement with CPP. BSI continues to believe that CPP is specialist field that requires specialist input, an approach supported by the White Cell in 2018, when BSI carved out CPP into its own niche to deepen and enrich the training experience.

5.3 Although the Skolkan 2 scenario lacks any state party infrastructure for cultural heritage or its management, White Cell support again enabled BSI to represent the Deputy Minister (Culture) for the Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth, and Sport. However, this blurring of scenario roles had implications for training engagement (discussed below). We note and thank the White Cell for their increasing support for CPP as a serious issue in its own right.

5.4 However, issues remain within the scenario in understanding CPP as a cross-cutting issue in scenario development. The Country handbook for the scenario noted Karlskrona Naval Base as a World Heritage site, with all implicit obligations for its protection. Events scripted there should have required engagement from all branches, particularly media, which was not possible and reflected the variable level of CPP awareness in the scenario development team. Notably, the military description of the naval base (P186) does not reflect the cultural description as a protected area (P261).

5.5 If aware at all, incident writers chose to ignore its protected status in order to advance their storylines. Future scenario development must realise CPP has implications across the scenario in order to create scenarios that are consistent: CPP is not a legal obligation that can be ‘turned off’ when convenient.

5.6 This confusion is reflective of the fact that protected areas are relegated to near the end of the country handbook (P255 of 275), and not integrated, and the implicit obligations are not detailed.

5.7 This is further reflected in CPPs status as an appendix to an appendix in Annex W (CIMIC) to OPLAN 5001O. BSI notes that each World Heritage site is also only a centre point, which fails to encapsulate that each site covers several thousand hectares.

Training

5.8 Cultural heritage protection training objectives must reflect individual training levels. This makes for a training challenge for exercise writers and requires careful event/incident scripting. In this case, with only minimal training amongst the TA, BSI also provided a one-hour mentoring session, with the full encouragement of the JVC Evaluation team, in order to enable deeper engagement with CPP obligations.
5.9 BSI storyline development revolves around the core pillars of the Convention, realised through the subordinate relationship of NATO to the host nation that owns the cultural property, and the implied obligations therein.

5.10 The peacetime pillars:
   a) **Designation of competent authorities**: In accordance with the Convention, cultural property is owned by the host nation, and its Ministry of Culture (or equivalent). All CPP activity should be carried out in full coordination with the Ministry, roleplayed here by BSI. The political structure of the TRJR scenario (played by the White Cell) does not establish state party ministries of culture, nor does it designate wider competent authorities responsible for safeguarding activities, although NATO is clearly recognising the value of such an approach in its future work.

   b) **Inventories**:
      i. Inventories are crucial to conduct effective CPP – in order to protect cultural property NATO must know what and where it is. However, this responsibility to protect sites goes far beyond the integration of the inventory into the No Strike List⁴. 
      ii. TRJA19, like TRJA18, did not contain a prioritised list of cultural property inventory, a situation sadly reflective of the real world, although there was a (culturally brief) No-Strike list. This limited exercise development, particularly relevant as the exercise was designed specifically to train the Joint Logistic Support Group in the crisis area, whose manoeuvring would be significantly impacted by a truly detailed list. In general, BSI has found that, perhaps as few LEGADs have had opportunity to engage

⁴ As noted in both BSI Exercise Trident Jaguar Report 2018, and BSI Exercise ARRCADE Globe 2019.
with the 1954 Hague Convention, understanding of the serious logistical implications of the Convention are absent: this remains an area requiring development.

c) **Planning of emergency measures for protection against fire and structural collapse:** For the purposes of this high-level command post exercise, it is assumed the host nation had carried out emergency planning. However, this cannot always be assumed to be the case, and in some circumstances a lack of host nation planning could seriously impact NATO operations, or lead to a request for support, such as during disaster relief operations. Future planning could encompass this: the recent UK CPP Special to Arms Course⁵ included training in emergency CPP First Aid; an area the Austrian Armed Forces also train in⁶.

d) **Preparation for the removal of movable CP or the provision of adequate in situ protection:** In accordance with the Convention, the TA were presented with a challenge to provide in situ protection to sites under Special and Enhanced Protection at the request of the host nation. Enabling an informed decision is a cross-cutting task, exercising all branches of NATO in their obligation to support the host nation, culminating in the need for a COMMAND level decision. The lack of a fully developed scenario in this area hindered the storyline, but the impact was minimal given the timing constraints of the exercise, and the low-level of existing CPP training. However, as NATO staff become more CPP aware, a deeper and richer cultural scenario will be needed to fully engage the TA.

5.11 Collectively, these allow NATO to exercise the Executive Armed Conflict pillars – for example, consideration of the use of the distinctive emblem and apparatus of control when considering carrying out safeguarding measures.

5.12 In addition to its legal obligations, BSI also trains NATO in the importance of CPP in the Information Operations (INFO OPS) domain. Cultural heritage is implicitly newsworthy and its destruction (and protection) have been wielded ruthlessly and to great effect in recent conflicts. Indeed, CPP became a growing operational concern for NATO after the positive press received for CPP during Operation Unified Protector in Libya in 2011⁷. Even in areas where NATO has no legal obligation to conduct CPP, failure to do so, and failure to manage the information domain, can result in significant reputational loss, whilst successful media management results in reputational gain.

5.13 In this respect, scripting INFO OPS problem sets was challenging to synchronise with the wider exercise. An event was scripted to create negative press for NATO and to impact the sentiment analysis (indicating public opinion) if the event was not proactively managed. However, the event occurred at the same time as an event where NATO received positive press for supporting a hospital, which received significantly more attention, undermining the CPP lessons.

5.14 For political reasons, NATO refuses to script incidents where NATO staff have engaged in misconduct. All allegations (by BSI and other NGOs and SMEs) always turned out to be false. Whilst acknowledging the difficulties of engaging (and roleplaying) some types of misconduct

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⁵ [https://theblueshield.org/ukbs-supports-uks-first-cpp-special-to-arm-course/](https://theblueshield.org/ukbs-supports-uks-first-cpp-special-to-arm-course/)
⁷ See for example, [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwDeFXmfPYM&feature=youtu.be](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BwDeFXmfPYM&feature=youtu.be)
as a teaching team, this teaches a false lesson about NATO conduct, and does not allow the TA to truly engage with their responsibilities for ensuring staff conduct and building integrity within NATO forces. Incidents which repeat on all exercises for all HQ staff— whilst perhaps formulaic— would ensure no individual HQ was maligned.

6. Exercise

6.1 Whilst we acknowledge that CPP is only a minor part of a much wider exercise, NATO generally regards combat as the ultimate measure of performance. During 2018, BSI found that there was a tendency to “regard non-kinetic issues, such as the protection of civilians, cultural heritage protection, and host nation opinion as picturesque scenery that had to be acknowledged, but must not be allowed to present significant challenges demanding close attention by headquarters staff”\(^8\). This issue remains and is, in part, due to a lack of doctrine, resulting in— at best— a modest level of training. Most of the TA (and plenty of EXCON) have never had cause to engage with CPP and the 1954 Hague Convention.

6.2 However, we recognise the growing awareness of the importance of CPP in NATO forces, moving beyond the shallow understanding that CPP amounts to the receipt and integration of a No-Strike List. All staff at NRDC-Spain underwent basic CPP awareness training as part of exercise deployment, and a full half of the MAFA (Military Assistance Force in Arnland) Soldier’s Card relates to CPP obligations (as per article 7.1, 1954 Hague Convention\(^9\)). In this respect NRDC-Spain are to be commended.

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\(^9\) Article 7. Military measures

1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to introduce in time of peace into their military regulations or instructions such provisions as may ensure observance of the present Convention, and to foster in the members of their armed forces a spirit of respect for the culture and cultural property of all peoples.
6.3 However, awareness training alone does not provide sufficient understanding / knowledge to enable best practice in staff planning and operations, where CPP is most relevant, and initially resulted in a failure to comprehend the extent and depth of CP obligations in TA operational conduct and host nation engagement.

6.4 This manifested as:
   a) A clear reluctance to engage with the Ministerial representative for Culture, and so with the legal obligations of the TA, without significant pushing from several areas of EXCON (from both Ministerial levels within the scenario, and from Evaluation team).
   b) A failure to recognise and prepare for CPP as part of NATO's Protection of Civilians agenda, and as a component of the civilian and NGO space.
   c) A partial failure to address CPP as a cross-cutting topic, with some branches initially failing to acknowledge their CPP responsibilities and dedicate collaborative attention to it in a busy battlespace.
   d) A failure to share relevant information both within branch and across, indicating CPP was not seen as a priority across the TA, but an issue only for those directly and clearly tasked with dealing with it. NATO branches were unprepared to include CP as a factor in the civilian space. No intelligence assessment had been conducted on risk to heritage – or to heritage staff. Despite a week-long series of incidents placing CP at risk and a host-nation risk assessment shared and discussed with NATO, when pushed J2 declared there to be “no risk” to CP or CP staff. In a real situation, this could result in civilians failing to take precautions and being placed at risk, and a unmitigated risk to CP.
   e) A failure to recognise and manage CP as a significant Information Operations Challenge, resulting in reputational damage to NATO, and a diplomatic incident with the host nation at Ministerial level.
   f) A failure to recognise the requirement for NATO to share CPP information and proactively coordinate with the Ministry of Culture when issues relating to CPP were under discussion (e.g., LEGADs, Military Police, Info Ops).
   g) In addition, the lack of a clearly defined Ministry of Culture in the scenario led to confusion amongst the TA about the training support BSI was there to provide, with (not unreasonable) assumptions about BSI's ability (as the Deputy Minister (Culture) for the Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport) to provide scenario information regarding child soldiers (Youth), and cultural and societal information from cultural locations across the setting, which was not possible.

6.5 However, in other respects, the TA performed admirably and are to be commended, demonstrating what CPP good practice should look like for NATO. Examples included
   a) CPP awareness raising for all staff
   b) Detailed engagement with the cultural information domain to support in depth, cross-branch activity
   c) Understanding and activation of the Mission of Control, exemplified in close coordination with the host nation.
   d) Creation of a cross-cutting CPP working group attended by all branches
   e) Strong LEGAD engagement with the 1954 Hague Convention, Protocols and Regulations, providing the framework for ensuing NATO activity
   f) Consideration of the use of the distinctive emblem and apparatus of control
   g) Growing awareness of the symbolic power of CPP as a target, in addition to its strategic value
h) Initial preparation for future CPP as NATO advanced into a new AoR, recognising that cultural heritage is especially at risk during transitional operational phases

6.6 A key lesson from TRJA18 was that: “Effective cultural heritage protection is conditional on dynamic cultural heritage intelligence production that extends beyond issues relating to the targeting function, the no-strike list, and state party cultural heritage inventories. […] There is scope for enhancing the J2 contribution to cultural heritage protection exercise activity, and thereby teach important lessons in the future. The existence of a dynamic ‘no-strike’ list is vital, but does not inform every context in which cultural heritage protection decisions must be made: […] Exercising the J2 intelligence function in support of cultural heritage protection staff activity is highly desirable. It requires detailed planning early on during exercise development”\(^\text{10}\).

6.7 In this respect, some members of J2 excelled, requesting unscripted meetings with the MoC staff (played by BSI), where they sought deep engagement with the cultural information domain and how it could contribute to mission success in multiple areas. Although the scenario was not detailed enough to support this, the attempt was extremely valuable.

6.8 Individual storylines and lessons are detailed below: it should be emphasised that the majority of storyline 1 and 2 occurred before any CPP mentoring, and reflects the modest level of pre-existing training in the TA.

**Storyline 1 – Host Nation Engagement (introduction to legal obligations)**

6.9 Initial scripted incidents revolved around establishing host nation engagement and developing TA engagement with the host nation, starting with a letter to the Commander laying out his obligations and requesting a meeting with an appointed delegate (see Annex 1).

6.10 The TA demonstrated an initial reluctance to engage, perhaps reflecting the low level of training received previously. Without doctrine, it remains unclear which branch retains overall responsibility as the CPP lead, resulting in confusion. There is a clear risk that when everyone is responsible, no-one is, resulting in a potential failure for NATO to realise its obligations.

6.11 In part due to the mentoring received, as the CP problem set unfolded in the battlespace its relevance became clear, and the TA developed a detailed understanding of CP with the host nation as the owner and NATO responsibilities in that regard.

6.12 By the final day of BSI attendance, host nation engagement relating to the storyline problem sets was extremely well coordinated across all branches and externally by J9 CIMIC, who should be commended.

6.13 However, this engagement was not reflected in a wider meeting with NGOs on BSI’s final day of exercise, where Blue Shield played itself. Although NATO issued the invitation to Blue Shield, NATO branches were unprepared to include CP as a factor in the civilian space. No intelligence assessment had been conducted on risk to heritage – or to heritage staff. Despite a week-long series of incidents placing CP at risk and a host-nation risk assessment shared and discussed with NATO, when pushed J2 declared there to be “no risk” to CP or CP staff. In a real situation, this could result in civilians failing to take precautions and being placed at risk, and a unmitigated risk to CP.

Storyline 2 – Damage at church: NATO blamed (Impact of media on operations)

6.14 A church was badly damaged, and NATO was blamed. The incident became public via social media, with thanks to the Media Team. Blue Shield (as itself) issued a statement on social media about the incident calling for an investigation; the incident trended on social media (#ShameOnNATO); journalists called NATO for information, and by the end of the day it reached national Arnish News.

6.15 The TA initially failed to engage with either the incident or the Host Nation. A single line email was sent to Blue Shield, with no context (or even introduction) - “Is this Fake news?”. Coupled with a check on whether NATO forces were in the area, this was the extent of the investigation into the incident.

6.16 In the evening COM briefing, CPP was presented as green – no risk. This resulted in a diplomatic incident between the Minister of Culture and NATO. The storyline was marked by ongoing failure by NATO to engage with the MoC: NATO’s statements were not cleared with the MoC, or issued jointly as requested; the MoC received updates on the investigation via social media, and it was the final day of exercise before the MoC received a copy of NATO’s initial report investigating the incident (summarised on social media some days earlier).

6.17 This incident presents several lessons for NATO: it should be emphasised that many were learned by NRDC-Spain over the exercise.
   a) NATO failed to recognise the significance of the incident, and to respond proactively, losing control of the INFO OPS domain. The fictional incident was conducted by NATO adversaries, and reflects real world action by insurgents. As a result, NATO suffered a significant reputational loss that could have been avoided or mitigated.
   b) NATO failed to proactively manage host nation engagement, and the extent of this obligation. NATO treated the incident as a NATO problem set, not as a sphere in which they were subordinate to the host nation, and where activity should be coordinated with them.
   c) NATO failed to realise the significance of the incident within their wider CPP obligations. Having established they were not responsible, they failed to comprehend that cultural property was clearly being used as an adversarial weapon and was at risk as a direct result of NATO operations.
   d) This was particularly relevant as NATO’s stance to CPP over the week was that their presence contributed to security. Whilst true, no attempt was made to reconcile these conflicting issues.
   e) NATO’s approach to CIMIC in their investigation was problematic: there were multiple instances of NATO troops being accused of misconduct over the week. In all cases, NATO’s first response was to assume it was fake news. Whilst NATO is regularly the victim of fake news, this will not always be the case, and here the incident was real, even if NATO were not responsible. Furthermore, it is insulting to the professionalism of the organisations NATO engages with to automatically assume they are sharing fake news. In addition to the need for greater tact when dealing with professional civilian organisations, NATO need to realise that there will be instances where their troops are engaged in misconduct, and to learn to handle those situations.

6.18 It should be noted that NATO troops did not take part in CPP mentoring until after this storyline. As the week progressed, many of the issues identified were resolved, demonstrating the interest, engagement and willingness to learn of the TA.
Storyline 3 – Host nation support for in situ protection

6.19 The TRJA19 audience received a request from the Ministry of Culture (Annex 2) to provide in situ protection for two sites at risk supported by an initial risk assessment, a World Heritage site under Special Protection and a Cathedral under Enhanced Protection11 – a host nation problem set based within the legal obligation for NATO to support the host nation in protecting their cultural property. They were confronted with the task of planning the protection required – undertaking detailed, cross-cutting staff work leading to the production of a commander’s decision brief, for the commander to prioritise resource allocation, understanding the requirement to brief and host nation and justify whatever decision is reached.

6.20 Although several branches were initially reluctant to attend, J9 CIMIC (with support from the Evaluation Team) coordinated a cross-cutting CPP working group attended by all branches, a major CPP activity. The Working group successfully demonstrated that CPP is a real cross-branch issue, with shared responsibility across the whole HQ.

6.21 The initial risk assessment was used as the foundation for detailed planning of a in depth evaluation of risks, threats and vulnerabilities of the sites. It also included consideration of the use of the distinctive emblem and apparatus of control, as laid down in the Regulations for Execution of the 1954 Hague Convention.

6.22 The J9 CIMIC cross-branch brief and working group coordination was deservedly highlighted by the Evaluation Team as good practice, and BSI note the LEGAD engagement was stronger than we have ever seen on exercise previously. This was a real exercise success that should be developed on future exercises, and those responsible performed excellently.

6.23 J9 followed up the cross-branch meeting with a MoC meeting to plan a visit to one of the at-risk sites, again demonstrating good practice in coordinating fully with the host nation to develop a mutual response.

6.24 The planning meeting also included preliminary preparations for the second site, which would shortly fall within NATO’s AoR as they advanced, and recognition that during periods of transition from one operational phase to another, cultural heritage is especially at risk if uncoordinated planning generates unintended security and governance vacuums during transitional operational phases.

6.25 Again, this forward planning for CPP represents good practice for NATO, and is a testament to the excellent work of J9 CIMIC, supported by the other branches.

11 Although the scenario is non-international armed conflict, BSI notes 1954 Hague Convention Article 19. Conflicts not of an international character

1. In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as, a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property.
2. The parties to the conflict shall endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

Following consultation with an Evaluation Team LEGAD, BSI took the stance that the host nation had agreed with NATO – as Parties to the conflict – to respect the maximum standards of international law, and to bring all provisions of the Convention into effect, rather than assuming a minimalist stance.
Figure 5: J9 CIMIC staff attend a meeting with representatives of the Host Nation Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport (Culture).

**Storyline 5 – Targeting**

6.26 A targeting incident was scripted that would place high payoff targets on cultural property, initially scripted on the World Heritage site, and then – as the exercise progressed – this was moved to a fictional archaeological site. The MoC insisted on the right to “red card” NATO targeting decisions if cultural property consultation did not occur. However, the deliberately minimal targeting conducted by the TA cancelled the incident.

6.27 Nonetheless, we acknowledge the invaluable support of the EXCON targeting staff to develop a suitable incident, and of the White Cell “Arnish minister” to support a cultural element (by providing cultural input via a (simulated) phone call) during a targeting board.

6.28 This was significant: it demonstrated the value that cultural subject matter expertise can bring to targeting, and indicated a possible route by which such discussions could occur whilst retaining the classified nature of targeting boards.
Figure 6: Fictional archaeological site report indicating an area with legal protection. The fields, including some of the archaeological area containing fictional human remains, would have been the location of a high value target.

**Storyline – Other: Transparency International**

6.29 BSI also worked with Transparency International to develop cooperative storylines with synergistic effects, including NATO involvement in the illicit trafficking of Arnish objects as part of a storyline revolving around corruption within NATO.

6.30 NATO’s response to this storyline from a CPP perspective was disappointing. As a criminal storyline, it engaged different lead branches to the CPP storylines. These branches failed to engage with their responsibility to prevent looting and illicit trafficking as an aspect of the 1954 Hague Convention and its 1954 First Protocol, treating it as general looting of civilian property. Legally speaking, this is correct, and whilst there was of course understanding that looting should be prevented, there was no deeper engagement with the need for cooperation with the Ministry of Culture, or NATO’s wider obligations.

6.31 This lack of engagement was reflected in a failure for LEGADS and Military Police to coordinate directly with the MoC regarding the investigation, or through J9 and indirectly with the MoC. The MoC was dismissed by LEGADS and told to get information from MOPO, rather than being treated as a relevant stakeholder in its own right, a highly problematic stance, reflective of closeted thinking where “police only talk to other police”.

a) This resulted in a significant lack of information sharing about the investigation into illicitly trafficked cultural property, with no clear lines of communication or identification of relevant stakeholders. The information about the risk to CP from looting never reached the J2 members dealing with the other CP / MoC storylines, and so did not inform the cross-branch risk assessment of threats to CP being coordinated by J9. Nor did it reach the J2 staff member doing the NGO risk briefing. Conversely when the MoC gave their
information on the looting to J9 to pass on, J9 had no idea what to do with the information, preventing it contributing to the investigation.

b) There was no engagement with the MoC as the owner of the CP, and the person to whom it should be returned. The MoC also requested that - if a NATO member was arrested and tried in their home country for looting Arnish CP – the MoC be kept informed of the progress of the investigation, which was also dismissed.

c) Lastly, the 1954 Hague Convention obliges NATO to prevent looting of cultural property. Once looting had been identified, NATO should conduct cross-cutting work to identify the extent of its obligations in this area, which did not occur.

7. Overall Lessons Learned and Lessons Identified

Doctrine and Training

7.1 The identification of CPP collective training objectives: NATO must identify collective training objectives for CPP at the outset, which should influence setting design and exercise realisation. These objectives must recognise the varied levels of experience, training, and roles in relation to CPP across all NATO branches.

7.2 Early engagement with NGOs constitutes best practice: it enables detailed scripting of events and incidents with expert input that support the training objectives.

7.3 To date, BSI has realised self-appointed training objectives as a CPP SME.

7.4 Mentoring: the training vacuum created by the lack of doctrine creates a scripting and exercise challenge, working with and exercising an untrained staff. The difference in perspective and competence of staff before and after CPP mentoring is marked.

7.5 Need for Doctrine: There is a clear need for NATO doctrine in this area:

a) Such doctrine should work out of the 1954 Hague Convention. It provides an overarching framework for the conduct of CPP within a military mission, against which hard decisions can be made.

b) This in turn enables collective training objectives for NATO to train against.

7.6 In addition, without doctrine, it remains unclear which branch retains overall responsibility as the CPP lead, resulting in confusion. There is a clear risk that is everyone is responsible, no-one is, resulting in a potential failure for NATO to realise its obligations. A clear lead would also enable a defined point of contact to coordinate sharing of information, within and cross-branch.

Scenario

7.7 Civil environment: The setting must include a detailed civil environment that goes beyond window dressing to combat events, and it must include a separate Ministry of Culture in order to fully develop engagement with CPP under the 1954 Hague Convention. The Convention dictates that cultural property and its management belong to the host nation, and NATO must act within that framework to support them and their activity.

7.8 It is vital to roleplay the organisation of control: true cross cutting engagement requires the setting to contain host nation appointed representatives for culture at national, regional, and
local levels.

7.9 In turn, NATO must have a detailed cross-cutting understanding of how that impacts the scenario.

7.10 Scenario development must include CPP consistently, recognising where its inclusion impacts on the scenario and on exercises development. The presence of the Karlskrona World Heritage site and NATO’s failure to integrate it within the scenario demonstrated a shallow wider understanding of cultural issues, and risked teaching the false lesson that CPP obligations can be ‘turned off’ when convenient with no consequences. This in turn reiterates the need for SME engagement as early as possible.

7.11 Looting and trafficking: Both the wider scenario and incident development need a trafficking and looting framework that LEGADS, military police, CIMIC and CPP officers can engage with, and all need to understand their cooperative responsibilities within that framework in relation to the host nation. Perhaps more than any other aspect of CPP, looting and trafficking is a cross-cutting issue that reaches across NATO branches, into other NATO areas such as building integrity, and one that reaches back to a similarly wide spectrum of host nation representatives, to say nothing of the international community, such as INTERPOL.

7.12 From a training perspective, and in light of the above, it was valuable to secure synergy with Transparency International in particular; the collaborative work added depth and richness to our mutual training goals, and led to realistically three-dimensional problem sets involving cross-cutting coordination. NGO collaboration like this strengthens the environment the TA operate under, providing more realistic engagement.

7.13 Inventories: TRJA19, like TRJA18, did not contain a prioritised list of cultural property inventory, a situation sadly reflective of the real world, although there was a (culturally brief) No-Strike list. NATO must invest in the collection and provision of CPP data, both real and on exercise, if it wants to train its cross-branch CPP obligations, and then realise them on operations. Effective cultural heritage protection is conditional on dynamic cultural heritage intelligence production that extends beyond issues relating to the targeting function, the no-strike list, and state party cultural heritage inventories.

7.14 In this respect, NATO’s member states – nearly all of whom have signed the 1954 Hague Convention – should realise their obligation to supply this vital data.

Future Activity

7.15 Warfighting: Current exercises BSI have attended have revolved around Article 4/ non-Article 5 Crisis Response and Stabilisation scenarios. However, there is a vital need to exercise CPP in Article 5 scenarios. The 1954 Hague Convention remain no less valid during warfighting although the constraints of LOAC may be evaluated differently. Given this, CPP and the Protection of Civilians agenda must be exercised just as strenuously during warfighting scenarios. They are neither aspirational nor ‘wallpaper’ to the ‘real’ fighting, but the legal and moral constraints such fighting must be conducted under, and like any other aspect they must be trained and exercised. If we could do it in the Second World War, when everything was on the line in the context of Total War, we can do it now!
7.16 Dedicated staff: Current training scenarios and training goals reflect the moderate level of existing knowledge. However, detailed CPP is a specialist activity, requiring specialist training and dedicated staff officers, with processes that are embedded in staff operational processes. The 1954 HC presents a legal framework for conducting such activity in a military environment.

Blue Shield’s Perspective

7.17 From our perspective, it was highly valuable to be able to test ideas and processes to enable effective CPP in a NATO context. The Organisation of Control remains an underused aspect of the Convention, but one that is critical to successful CPP.

7.18 Skolkan 2 is a non-international armed conflict, and it was extremely valuable to be able to test the provisions of the main Convention relating to that. In that respect, we note the following provisions of the Convention:

Article 19. Conflicts not of an international character
1. In the event of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the provisions of the present Convention which relate to respect for cultural property [i.e. Article 4].
2. The parties to the conflict shall endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

7.19 Although Article 4 [respect] is widely considered to be all that applies in non-international armed conflict, Blue Shield took the stance, supported by NATO lawyers, that this represents only the minimum standard, and that – in this scenario – the host nation was well within their rights to request that NATO, as a party to the conflict, support the rest of the Convention as well.

7.20 As well as allowing us to fully exercise the obligations of the Convention, this also represents best practice by armed forces intending to conduct CPP. Future NATO non-article 5 exercises should consider including this MOU in the exercise pack.

7.21 Although there were some issues with integration of NGOs into the exercise – for example, the documentation prepared by us during MEL/MIL scripting was not transferred to the exercise itself – in general the NGO support provided by the JWC was excellent, enabling BSI. However, the activity of all participants in the exercise, whatever their role, was realised via NATO’s SECRET HIGH CIS infrastructure. Effective participation is conditional on BSI staff holding clearance to work at NATO SECRET, which is a precondition for access to exercise intranets, including email, dynamic social media spaces, and exercise materials, across the higher controller (HICON) and the training audience domains.
8. Core Publications and Frameworks

International Humanitarian Law

- The Geneva Conventions 1949 Additional Protocols 1977

NATO publications

- Cultural Property Protection as a Force Multiplier, Science for Peace and Security Programme, 2017
- An Introduction to Operations Planning at the Operational Level, 2013

UNESCO publications:

- The Protection of Cultural Property Military Manual

9. Acknowledgements

BSI particularly valued the support received from the JWC and the Exercise Evaluation Team, who continued to take a close interest in the CPP learning, but also from the EXCON team more widely. Their support was vital and enriched both our participation and the learning outcomes for the TA, and we thank them for it.
Annex 1 – Letter to TA to establish relations with Ministry of Culture

GOVERNMENT OF ARNLAND
Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport
Department of Culture

~ FOR OUR PAST – FOR OUR FUTURE – FOR US ALL ~

COM MAFA
27 September 2019
Cultural Property Protection

Dear Sir

I am the Arland national representative for cultural property situated in our territory, responsible for organising its protection, and for dealing with any matters arising from the application of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two (1954 and 1999) Protocols, and the Regulations for its execution. Recognizing that NATO is committed to uphold the principles of international humanitarian law, I write to urge MAFA to support my Ministry in its efforts to safeguard and protect national cultural property.

Compliance with the 1954 Hague Convention

We draw to your attention, in particular, to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two (1954 and 1999) Protocols, whose purpose is to create a legal and procedural framework that, when enacted, has the effect of minimizing the impact of armed conflict on cultural property.

The Convention establishes the principal of immunity: all parties must refrain from any act of hostility directed against cultural property, and are obliged to refrain from any use of such property or its immediate surroundings for military purposes likely to expose it to destruction or damage. We emphasize that this obligation may be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver. Any military action or activity that risks the integrity of cultural property will be judged in accordance with the principles of the laws of armed conflict.

Safeguarding of movable and immovable cultural property

We wish to make you aware that the 1954 Convention provides a regime for the granting of special protection to cultural property defined as "of very great..."
importance to a people. Special protection may involve either creating a limited number of refuges to shelter movable cultural property in this category, or identifying centres containing monuments and other immovable cultural property. We wish to stress that, in accordance with the law, wherever possible cultural property of very great importance has been evacuated to refuges, centres containing monuments and other immovable cultural property will be placed under protective measures as a matter of priority, and that Armland has closed all its museums and cultural sites. However, we remain concerned about immovable sites, especially those directly associated with Kalmar history and culture. We respectfully urge MAFA to manifest its commitment to international customary law by supporting Armland in the implementation of cultural property protection measures should Armland request it.

Corruption and the illegal trafficking in cultural objects

Looting and the illegal trafficking in cultural property is prevalent in Armland in general, and Kalmar in particular. We draw your attention to the relevant statutory instrument – the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property, of which we are a signatory. The Minister of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport respectfully requests that MAFA exercises maximum restraint, prohibiting the acquisition or handling of cultural artefacts on their own account, or on behalf of third parties.

Deliberate targeting

We understand that MAFA might need to strike high payoff military targets in Kalmar in particular, and is compiling a target list in consultation with the Arnish Ministry of Defence. Armland reserves the right to veto, or “red card”, any MAFA targeting decision. In the context of cultural property protection, the Ministry of Culture expects to be consulted during any target development activity concerning planned targets sited on, or in the immediate vicinity of, Arnish cultural property, in order to advise on site vulnerabilities and risk mitigation. In this context, we draw your attention in particular to our wonderful World Heritage Sites: the Agricultural Landscape of Southern Öland (Öland Island), the Naval Port of Karlskrona, and Grimeton Radio Station, Varberg.
GoA – MAFA cooperation

My staff in the Ministry, and in our many heritage institutions, have been directed to support you in every way, including the provision of subject matter advice. MAFA is requested to provide its own point of contact.

To discuss the issues I have raised in this letter, I would like to request a formal meeting to occur on September 30th, at a time of your convenience.

I look forward to a positive and fruitful relationship with MAFA. It remains for me only to assure you that we remain wholly partial to our Constitution, the Convention and its two Protocols, the 1970 Illicit Trafficking Convention, and the Geneva Conventions in pursuit of cultural property protection during this regrettable crisis.

Sincerely

Dr Paul Zarro

Dr Poul Zorro
Assistant Director (Culture)
Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport
Email: Paul.Fox@ricc1.mss.nato.int
Tel: 940 800 105 1034
Annex 2 – Letter requesting in situ protection and risk assessment

***EXERCISE***

NATO UNCLASSIFIED RELEASABLE TO EXERCISE TRIDENT JACKAL 2019

GOVERNMENT OF ARNLAND
Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport
Department of Culture

— FOR OUR PAST — FOR OUR FUTURE — FOR US ALL —

MAFA J9 (CIMIC)
2 October 2019

REQUEST FOR IN SITU PROTECTION

Dear Sir,

Further to our discussion yesterday, and your request for a list of our most high priority cultural priority, I write formally to request MAFA support for the physical protection of two particularly important cultural heritage sites:

- The World Heritage site, <> Radio Station - a site under Special Protection according to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property

Recent events, including the destruction at <>, suggest that the APF in particular is actively targeting cultural property in order to erode support for GoA in general, and MAFA's presence in particular. Both these sites are implicated in current political tension: the Radio Station was designed by an architect from Kalmar, and incorporates Kal architectural motifs; the cathedral contains the graves of political and military leaders associated with the historical conquest of Kalmar. Damage or destruction at either site is likely to provoke widespread outrage, frustrating our plans to build political legitimacy and social cohesion.

The Ministry employs a private company tasked with providing physical security at all high status cultural sites. They are unarmed and underequipped to deal with current estimated threats. Our over-stretched police and militia forces are unable to assist. In these circumstances these sites are particularly vulnerable: the risk we are carrying – to the state and to the mission – is enormous.

I therefore request a meeting with you today (2nd) or tomorrow (3rd) in order to discuss MAFA support. I shall be visiting <> for the majority of the 2nd, so please
GOVERNMENT OF ARNLAND
Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport
Department of Culture

— FOR OUR PAST — FOR OUR FUTURE — FOR US ALL —

copy all correspondence to my World Heritage site manager, Dr Emma Wyman, who will be available to meet with you during my absence on the 2nd.

Sincerely

Dr Paul Zorro

Dr Poul Zorro
Assistant Director (Culture)
Ministry of Tourism, Culture, Youth and Sport

Cc: Dr Emma Wyman

(email1)
(email2)
Request for in situ protection

Cathedral – ENHANCED PROTECTION

World Heritage Site – SPECIAL PROTECTION

Threat

- Theft
  - Organised crime
  - Opportunistic
- Vandalism
- Destruction
  - Combat
  - Other acts

Vulnerability

- No armed guards
- Intimidation of security staff
- Corruption of security staff
- Potential for site abandonment – no security
- Cathedral functions – open access to worship - site of significance
  - Small collection of sacred objects
  - Small historic archive of early religious texts
- World Heritage site – large open perimeter (110ha site) – open access from multiple avenues (1 3,800ha buffer zone)
  - Multiple buildings, functioning equipment, radio towers, visitor centre
- WHS - Privately owned residential area (25 residents) within the site
- WHS - Radio station still in (limited) commercial use

Risk Management Request

- Armed MAFF presence
- Reinforced perimeter/ layered physical security / access control?
- Quick reaction force
- Professional MAFF security survey